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Chapter 1:   Optimal Long-Run Inflation with Occasionally-Binding Financial Constraints. 
 
This paper studies the optimal inflation rate in a simple New Keynesian model with occasionally-
binding collateral constraints that intermediate-good firms face on hiring labor. For empirically-
relevant degrees of price rigidity, the optimal long-run annual inflation rate is in the range of half 
a percent to 2 percent, depending on whether it is TFP risk or markup risk or both that is the 
source of uncertainty in the economy. The shadow value on the collateral constraint is akin to an 
endogenous cost-push shock. Differently from usual cost-push shocks, however, this shock is 
asymmetric as it takes non-negative values only. Inflation is positive when the collateral 
constraint is binding and it is zero when it does not. Since the mean of this asymmetric 
endogenous cost-push shock is positive, inflation is also positive on average. In addition, a 
binding collateral constraint resembles a time-varying tax on labor, which the monetary authority 
can smooth by setting a positive inflation rate. More generally, the basic result is related to 




Chapter 2:   Optimal Monetary Policy and Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in Frictional 
Labor Markets. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that nominal wages in the U.S. are downwardly rigid. This paper 
studies the optimal long-run inflation rate in a labor search and matching framework under the 
presence of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity (DNWR). In this environment, optimal monetary 
policy targets a positive inflation rate; the annual long-run inflation rate for the U.S. is around 2 
percent. Positive inflation “greases the wheels” of the labor market by facilitating real wage 
adjustments, and hence it eases job creation and prevents excessive increase in unemployment 
following recessionary shocks. These findings are related to standard Ramsey theory of “wedge 
smoothing”; by following a positive-inflation policy under sticky prices, the monetary authority 
manages to reduce the volatility and the size of the intertemporal distortion significantly. The 
intertemporal wedge is completely smoothed when prices are fully flexible. Since the optimal 
long-run inflation rate predicted by this study is considerably higher than in otherwise 
neoclassical labor markets, the nature of the labor market in which DNWR is studied can be 
relevant for policy recommendations. 
 
Chapter 3:   Sticky Wages, Incomplete Pass-Through and Inflation Targeting: What is the 
Right Index to Target? 
 
This paper studies strict monetary policy rules in a small open economy with Inflation Targeting, 
incomplete pass-through and rigid nominal wages. The paper shows that, when nominal wages 
are fully flexible and pass-through is low to moderate, the monetary authority should target the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) rather than the Domestic Price Index (DPI). When pass-through is 
high, an economy with high degrees of nominal wage rigidity and wage indexation should either 
target the CPI or fully stabilize nominal wages. These results suggest that, by committing to a 
common monetary policy in a common-currency area, some countries may not be following the 
right monetary policy rules.  
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Optimal Long-Run Inflation with Occasionally-Binding Financial 
Constraints 
 
1.1     INTRODUCTION   
Recent economic events have revived interest in the optimal long-run inflation rate. This paper 
studies the optimal long-run inflation rate in a simple calibrated New Keynesian (NK) 
framework with occasionally-binding financial constraints. For empirically-plausible sizes of 
exogenous shocks, optimal monetary policy entails a strictly positive inflation rate in the long-
run. In particular, the optimal annual long-run inflation rate in the benchmark calibration of 
the model is about 0.5 percent when the economy is only subject to TFP shocks and slightly 
above 1 percent when the economy is hit by only markup shocks. When the economy is 
subject to both shocks simultaneously, the optimal long-run inflation rate is about 2 percent 
annually. The main result of the paper, namely the optimality of a positive inflation rate, is 
robust to introducing a motive for holding money.  
The baseline setup assumes three types of agents in the economy: households, 
entrepreneurs (or intermediate-good firms), and sticky-price firms that produce final goods. 
Financial frictions arise because hiring labor services by an entrepreneur is constrained by the 
level of her net worth. The collateral constraint is motivated by a type of the hold-up problem. 
Prior to supplying their labor services, households require the entrepreneur to show collateral 
that can be seized if needed.
1
 The accumulation of net worth is via purchases of shares that are 
claims on the profits of final-good firms. These shares pay out the profits of final-good firms 
as dividends to shareholders. 
There are two main differences between this paper and typical papers that study optimal 
monetary policy within a New Keynesian framework featuring financial frictions. First, this 
paper assumes an occasionally-binding collateral constraint rather than always-binding 
collateral constraints as usually assumed in this literature. Second, this paper focuses on the 
optimal long-run inflation rate (i.e. the mean of the inflation rate in the “stochastic steady 
state” of the model), whereas the focus of most existing literature on monetary policy and 
                                                          
1
 This setup is similar to a model in which the entrepreneur borrows at the beginning of each period to 
pay wages ahead of production, and borrowing is constrained by collateral. 
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financial frictions is on mainly on the short-run dynamics of inflation around the deterministic 
steady state.    
The assumption of an occasionally-binding collateral constraint not only renders the 
environment more realistic, but it generates asymmetry in the behavior of the economy in 
response to favorable vs. adverse shocks. The computational approach that I use to deal with 
occasionally-binding constraints is a penalty-function algorithm within a second-order 
approximation. This approach has been extensively used recently (e.g. Kim, Kollmann and 
Kim, 2010; Den Haan and Ocaktan, 2009; De Wind, 2008 and Preston and Roca, 2007). A 
detailed description of this methodology can be found in Judd (1998). 
When the collateral constraint binds, the shadow value of relaxing the collateral constraint 
is akin to a cost-push shock that generates inflation. The reason for that is straightforward: 
other things equal, a binding collateral constraint implies increases in the marginal costs of 
final-good firms which they accommodate by increasing prices. The inflation rate is positive 
on average due to the nature of this endogenous cost-push shock; it is asymmetric as it takes 
only non-negative values. In periods with a binding collateral constraint, inflation is positive. 
In periods with a non-binding collateral constraint, inflation is zero. Hence, inflation is 
positive on average since the shadow value on the collateral constraint is positive on average.  
The results of this paper also highlight the role of inflation in mitigating the impact of 
adverse shocks on the economy. A binding collateral constraint distorts the choice of labor by 
entrepreneurs, and thus it magnifies the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution 
between labor and consumption and the marginal product of labor (which exists due to the 
monopolistic power of final-good firms). This implies a deviation from the first-best level of 
output. The wedge (to which we refer as the “labor wedge”) resembles a labor-income tax, and 
it increases with the shadow value of relaxing the collateral constraint. The analyses show 
that, under optimal policy, the monetary authority counteracts the effects of a binding 
collateral constraint, and it thus smoothes the “tax rate” on labor. Since the collateral 
constraint is more likely to bind during downturns, monetary policy makers aim for, at least, 
avoiding excessive increase in the “tax rate” during such episodes.  
The ability of the monetary authority to smooth the “labor-income tax” (and more 
generally, the “labor wedge”) is limited due to the monopolistic power of final-good firms and 
the price rigidity. Put differently, the monetary authority does not have enough instruments to 
completely and simultaneously close the three distortions in the economy- the nominal 
distortion due to price rigidity, the monopolistic power of final-good firms, and the financial 
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distortion. Policy makers choose to spread the distortions across margins. Spreading 
distortions across all margins is well-known in the literature (Dupor, 2002).   
Recent work has suggested other factors that justify a positive inflation rate. Related to the 
current study, Antinolfi, Azariadis and Bullard (2010) point to the role of positive inflation in 
deepening asset markets and loosening debt contracts. Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) show, 
assuming a neoclassical labor environment, that the optimal long-run inflation rate is positive 
(around 0.4 percent annually) if nominal wages are downwardly rigid. Abo-Zaid (Chapter 2 of 
this document) reports a significantly higher optimal long-run inflation rate (around 2 percent 
annually) in a labor search and matching framework in the presence of downward nominal 
wage rigidity. Fagan and Messina (2009) suggest that the optimal inflation rate for the U.S. 
ranges between 2 percent and 5 percent when nominal wages are downwardly rigid. This 
paper contributes to the growing literature that study motives for setting positive long-run 
inflation rates.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model economy 
with the collateral constraint and defines the private-sector equilibrium and the optimal 
monetary policy problem. Section 3 discusses the labor wedge and the role of inflation in 
smoothing this wedge. Section 4 describes the calibration and the solution methodology of the 
model. Section 5 presents the optimal long-run inflation rate suggested by this paper. Impulse 
responses and the frequency of hitting the collateral constraint limit are also presented in this 
section. Section 6 presents the results of robustness analyses and section 7 concludes. 
 
1.2     THE MODEL ECONOMY  
The model is a variation of the standard New Keynesian model, with the basic structure by 
which financial frictions are modeled similar to the recent work of Carlstrom, Fuerst and 
Paustian (2010, CFP hereafter). The economy is populated by households, entrepreneurs that 
produce intermediate goods (in what follows, I refer to this sector as entrepreneurs and 
intermediate-good firms interchangeably), and final-good firms. Households consume 
differentiated final goods and supply labor on spot markets. Entrepreneurs hire labor services 
to produce homogenous intermediate goods. Entrepreneurs‟ labor demand is constrained by 
the accumulated value of their net worth. This constraint is the source of the financial friction. 
Final-good firms are monopolistic competitors that purchase intermediate goods from 
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entrepreneurs and costlessly produce final goods. The pricing of a final-good firm is subject to 
a direct resource cost, which is the source of price rigidity in this model.  
 
1.2.1   Households    
The representative household purchases the differentiated final goods and enjoy utility from a 
composite consumption index tc and supplies labor tl in each period t. Households have access 
to two financial instruments. The first is a standard one-period bond that pays a riskless 
nominal gross interest rate of tR . These bonds are in zero net supply, and, as in CFP, they 
make explicit pricing the nominal interest rate. In period t, households also purchase ts shares 
of final-good firms at a nominal per-share price of tQ . Total shares pay nominal dividends 
of tD , and their market supply is normalized to unity.  









t lvcuE  ,                                                                                                           (1) 
where 1 is the standard subjective discount factor, 0E is the expectation operator , )( tcu is 
the period utility function from consumption and )( tlv is the period disutility function from 

































. As standard in NK models, consumption 























,                                                                                                               (2) 
where 1t measures the elasticity of substitution between two varieties of final goods. The 
elasticity of substitution is allowed to be time-varying in order to allow for shocks to the 
desired markup, or, put differently, cost-push shocks. Other things equal, an increase 
in t leads to a fall in the desired markup (the optimal ratio of price to the marginal cost), and 
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hence to less inflationary pressures in equilibrium. I allow for markup shocks both due to their 
familiarity in New Keynesian models and because they generate a tradeoff for the monetary 
authority between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing output. In some of the experiments in 
section 5, I consider constant elasticity of substitution, and the main results are not, 
qualitatively, sensitive to whether markups are stochastic or not.  
Following standard derivations in Dixit-Stiglitz based NK models, the optimal allocation 































is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index that results from cost minimization.  
Maximization is subject to the sequence of nominal budget constraints of the form: 
ttttttttttttttttt TPPDQslwPBRBsQcP   )()1( 111  ,                             (4) 
with tc denoting consumption of the final good, tP is the nominal price of the final good, tw is 
the real wage, is a labor market subsidy that is introduced to ensure the efficiency of the 
deterministic steady state (i.e. to achieve the first-best level of output; see Appendix 1E for 
details). Finally, tT are real lump-sum transfers by the government, and t are real profits 
from the ownership of firms.    























b  is real bond holdings at the end of 






d  stands for real dividends.  
The optimal choices of consumption, bonds, labor supply and shares of final-good firms 



















































uEu 111,,   ,                                                                                             (8) 
where tcu , is the marginal utility of consumption in period t, tlu , is the marginal disutility of 








 denotes the gross price inflation rate. Equation (6) is 
the standard labor-supply condition, and equation (7) is the standard consumption Euler 
equation. Equation (8) prices shares of final-good firms; it equates the period-t marginal utility 
of consumption to the expected utility of expanding future consumption through the gross 
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1.2.2   Entrepreneurs/ Intermediate-Good Firms 
There is a continuum of long-lived entrepreneurs, each of whom produces intermediate goods. 
An entrepreneur hires labor services on sport markets in order to produce a homogonous good 
using the linear production function, 
ttt lAx  ,                                                                                                                                  (9) 
with tA denoting total factor productivity, which is identical across all entrepreneurs.   
Prior to supplying labor to an intermediate-good firm, households require that a part of 
their wages be backed up by collateral. This is the source of the financial friction in the model, 
about which more is discussed below. Given that a share of wage payments is collateralized, 
the intermediate-good firm then hires labor and starts production. Realized operating profits 
(revenues net of wage costs) and the beginning-of-the-period net worth can then be used to 
buy shares ( te ) for the next period. Positive operating profits are possible if the collateral 
constraint binds (see Appendix 1D for a proof). 
The collateral constraint can be motivated by the hold-up problem, as in Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997). Prior to supplying their labor services, households require some “guarantee” 
from the entrepreneur so that she does not force their wages down ex-post. In other words, the 
entrepreneur is required to back up the promised wage by some collateral that can be seized if 
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needed. Introducing the financial friction follows CFP and allows me to obtain the main 
results in a simple way.  
Formally, hiring labor is constrained by the-beginning-of-period net worth, as follows  
tttttt ndqelw    )(1 ,                                                                                                  (10)  
where, 1te stands for the share-holdings by the entrepreneur at the beginning of period t, and 
tn is the real value of net worth. The maximum share of net worth that can be used as 
collateral is (which is equivalent to the loan-to-value ratio in models with borrowing 
constraints). The parameter measures the “significance” of the financial friction: the higher 
this parameter is, the more “significant” (or “severe”) the financial friction. Clearly, if  =0 
then the model collapses to a standard new Keynesian model with no financial frictions. 
As shown in Appendix 1J, this setup is isomorphic to a model in which part of wages is 
required to be paid in advance (“working capital”), the entrepreneur obtains intra-period loans 
to finance this part of wages, and borrowing is constrained by collateral. The parameters and 
 come from two different constraints:  comes from the constraint that requires the 
collateralized wage payment to be lower than borrowing, and the parameter comes from the 
constraint that limits borrowing. Therefore, I use two separate parameters in condition (10) 
rather than only one parameter that is equal to their ratio.   
The most realistic setup, which is the main focus of this paper, is one in which the 
collateral constraint may only occasionally bind. For example, the constraint may not bind 
after a long series of positive shocks (Iacoviello, 2005). Assuming this constraint is always 
binding, as in CFP and other New Keynesian models with financial frictions do, imposes a 
restriction on the model‟s dynamics. Also, even if the constraint always binds at the 
deterministic steady state and for small (positive) shocks, it does not necessarily bind for large 
shocks. Because large shocks are of course sometimes observed in reality, it is important to 
understand the model‟s dynamics when constraints need not always bind.  
To my knowledge, allowing the collateral constraint to only occasionally bind is an 
innovation compared to studies of monetary policy in the presence of financial frictions. 
Recent studies assume always-binding collateral constraints (e.g. Iacoviello, 2005; Monacelli, 
2009 and Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian, 2010). Studying optimal monetary policy with 
occasionally-binding financial constraints can be viewed as another contribution of the paper. 




I assume that any remaining resources (or “profits”) will be remitted to households in a 
lump-sum fashion, and that in the process of accumulating shares, entrepreneurs are more 
impatient than households. For this reason, they discount the future using a discount factor 








   and 1 . The parameter  is needed to ensure that an 
entrepreneur will not accumulate enough assets so that the collateral constraint never binds. 
Finally, as will be discussed in subsection 2.6, the assumption that entrepreneurs remit their 
“profits” to households simplifies the objective function of the monetary policy maker; the 
goal is only maximizing the lifetime utility of households. An entrepreneur thus chooses labor 










t qedqelwlApE  ,                                                                 (11) 
subject to the sequence of collateral constraints (10). The variable tp denotes the relative price 
of the intermediate good in terms of the final good (and, in equilibrium, equals the marginal 
cost of final-good firms). The term in the square brackets is what I refer to as “profits,” and it 
corresponds, in equilibrium, to part of t in the budget constraint of households.   
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier on (10) by t , the optimal choices of labor and shares 
by an entrepreneur are characterized by (see Appendix 1B for details): 























E  ,                                                                                (13)    
where, as in CFP, the variable t can be interpreted as a “real interest rate” on a loan required 
for paying the wage bill of l in advance. Equation (12) states that, at the optimum, the 
marginal product of labor is equated to the real wage adjusted by a “financial markup” (i.e. the 
effective real wage from the viewpoint of the firm in the beginning of the period). Hence, if 
0 , then labor demand will be distorted by the existence of the collateral constraint if it 
binds. Ex ante, the cost of hiring a unit of labor is higher the tighter the collateral constraint. 
2
 
                                                          
2
 Condition (12) makes clear that profits are positive when the collateral constraint binds: under the 
optimal choice of the firm, the marginal product of labor exceeds the real wage.  
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p  , as is standard in NK models. Finally, 
equation (13) is a typical asset-pricing condition, but expanded to account for the imposition 




1.2.3   Final-Good Firms 
Firms in this market are monopolistically competitive. A final-good firm j purchases the 
homogenous intermediate goods from entrepreneurs at a relative price tp and transforms each 
unit of the intermediate good into a final good jty using a one-to-one technology.
4
 Each firm 
chooses its own price ( jtP ) to maximize profits subject to the downward-sloping demand for 
its product (see Appendix 1G for more details). The pricing of a final-good firm is subject to a 





















,                                                                                                                   (14) 
where is a parameter that governs the degree of rigidity. In a symmetric equilibrium, in 




























  ,                                        (15) 
where, tmc is the marginal cost of the final-good firm, which equals tp . As usual, because of 
the assumptions of one-to-one technology and zero fixed costs, the real marginal cost equals 
the real average cost. In the case of fully flexible prices ( )0  or fully stable prices ( 1t  
                                                          
3
 Condition (13) is consistent with condition (8) because of the variations of the Lagrange multiplier on 
the collateral constraint and the additional discount factor ( ). To fix ideas, consider the deterministic 
steady state versions of the two conditions. In this case, from (13) we get )1(1   , which makes 
the two conditions consistent.  
4
 I assume two types of firms in the production sector since the “asset” in this model is shares of final-
good firms. To avoid adding an asset (e.g. capital), and hence deviate from the linear-in-labor 
technology that is typically assumed in NK models, I assume two types of firms and introduce each 
friction in one sector.  
10 
 






 . Hence, in the 
absence of price adjustment costs, the real marginal cost equals the inverse of the optimal 
price markup.  
By combining conditions (6) and (12) and using the fact that )( tt pmc  , the Phillips 













































































)1( ,  (16) 
which explicitly shows the relationship between inflation and the financial friction (as 
measured by the multiplier t ). This is a key equation since it directly links inflation and the 
(binding) collateral constraint. The left hand side of condition (16) is increasing in t , which 
implies that, other things equal, an increase in t leads to an increase in inflation. In this 
regard, the Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint acts as an endogenous cost-push 
shock that generates inflation. Differently from typical cost push shocks, however, the shock 
in this model is asymmetric as it may not be negative. This fact has implications for the 
average inflation rate: since the mean of the endogenous asymmetric cost-push shock is 
positive (positive when the collateral binds and zero when it does not), the average inflation 
rate is, accordingly, positive.  
It is also worth nothing that, other things equal, the impact of t on inflation is decreasing 
in the degree of price rigidity and increasing in the “degree” of the financial friction. With 
very high degrees of price rigidity, the channel introduced through the collateral constraint is 
expected to be dominated by the cost of deviating from zero inflation. Also, the elasticity of 
labor supply is another factor that determines the impact of the collateral constraint on 
inflation. In the limiting case when labor is inelastically supplied, the collateral constraint has 
no effects on inflation. This can be easily seen by setting tlv , =0 in condition (16). The intuition 
behind this result is straightforward: when the equilibrium quantity of labor is independent of 
the financial friction, there is no inefficiency to correct for. Therefore, zero inflation is optimal 
for each period t under TFP shocks: when the quantity of labor is efficient, output is efficient 
as well. Therefore, setting a zero inflation rate does not lead to inefficiencies in production and 
since zero inflation minimizes the resource costs of adjust sting price, it is the optimal policy.  
11 
 
Finally, due to monopolistic competition, firms in this sector earn positive profits in 
equilibrium. These profits are paid in the form of dividends to shareholders. Real dividends 
are thus given by: 






.                                                                                          (17) 
 
1.2.4   Market Clearing 
In equilibrium, the resource constraint of the economy reads as follows: 






.                                                                                                        (18)  
Finally, market clearing for shares implies: 
1 tt se .                                                                                                                              (19)        
 
 
1.2.5   The Private Sector Equilibrium 
Definition 1: Given the exogenous processes },{ tt AR , the private sector equilibrium is a 
state-contingent sequence of allocations },,,,,,,,{ ttttttttt edqmcwlc  that satisfy the 
equilibrium conditions (6)-(8), (12)-(13), (15) and (17)-(18), and the complementary slackness 
condition .0))(( 1  tttttt lwdqe    
 
1.2.6   The Optimal Monetary Policy Problem  
I use a Ramsey-type approach to study optimal monetary policy. The monetary authority 
chooses allocations to maximize the lifetime utility of households subject to the resource 
constraint and the private-sector equilibrium conditions.
5
 The monetary authority is also 
assumed to solve a commitment problem.   
 
Definition 2: Given the exogenous process for technology tA , the monetary authority chooses 
a sequence of allocations },,,,,,,,{ ttttttttt edqmcwlc  to maximize (1) subject to the 
conditions (6), (8), (12)-(13), (15) and (17)-(18).     
 
                                                          
5
 The fact that “profits” of entrepreneurs are transferred to households simplifies the problem of the 
monetary policy maker; instead of maximizing some weighted average of the lifetime objective 
functions of households and entrepreneurs, the objective function of the monetary policy maker is only 
the lifetime utility of households.  
12 
 
1.3    OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND THE LABOR WEDGE 
This section presents an alternative way, related to basic Ramsey theory, to view the 
implications of the collateral constraint for optimal monetary policy. In the basic Ramsey 
theory, the aim of the planner is to smooth distortions (or “wedges”) over time. In this paper, a 
binding collateral constraint distorts the choice of labor by entrepreneurs and hence leads to 
suboptimal choice of labor. To see this, consider first the problem of the social planner who 
maximizes the expected present discounted utility of households subject to the goods-market 
resource constraint (see Appendix 1E for details). The condition characterizing the social 










,                                                                                                                                (20) 
which states that the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption should be 
equal to the marginal product of labor. In the decentralized economy, the equivalent condition 
























.                                                                                                          (21) 
The “labor wedge” is given by the term in the brackets (more precisely, the wedge is the 
difference between 1 and this term). In this paper, the labor wedge is a function of the 
Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint and the monopoly power of monopolistically-
competitive firms.  
The role of positive inflation in smoothing the wedge can be seen by substituting for 







































































.               (22) 
To fix ideas, assume that the economy is subject only to a TFP shock (i.e. t is constant) 
and let the difference between 1 and the term in brackets be defined as “labor-income tax”. 
Under zero-inflation policy, the numerator of (22) is constant, but the denominator varies t . 
If the monetary authority implements zero-inflation policy, then a negative shock that leads to 
13 
 
an increase in t will also result in a higher “tax rate”.
6
 This increase in the “tax rate” can be 
alleviated by appropriate setting of the inflation rate. In this case, by setting a positive inflation 
rate, the monetary authority can decrease the “tax rate” and smooth its variation. 
If t is allowed to be exogenously time-varying, setting a positive inflation rate has a 
similar role. Suppose that t falls (which implies a decrease in the degree of competitiveness 





) decreases, but 
the denominator increases. Both effects lead to increases in the “labor-income tax” and thus 
require greater response by the monetary authority.    
More generally, the aim of setting a positive inflation rate is to reduce and smooth the 
labor wedge, and thus to position the economy as close as possible to the efficient state. In this 
regard, optimal monetary policy in this paper is in line with basic Ramsey policy of smoothing 
distortions over the business cycle.  
                                                       
1.4     COMPUTATIONAL STRATEGY AND CALIBRATION  
The first subsection presents some discussion about the solution methodology applied in this 
study. Subsection 4.2 then discusses the parameterization of the model. 
 
1.4.1   Computational Strategy 
Ideally, occasionally-binding constraints should be handled using global computational 
methods, but this comes at the expense of tractability. Hence, I resort to local methods in order 
to approximate the solution of the model. However, standard perturbation methods, as they 
                                                          
6









 , with t being the labor-income tax rate. In our case, the 































































if t =1, then any increase in the shadow value of relaxing the collateral constraint will lead to an 




stand, cannot deal with occasionally-binding constraints. Therefore, I modify the problem by 
using the penalty function approach; this approach allows for any value of ttlw to be possible 
in principle, but it imposes penalty once the collateral constraint is violated. Since the 
constraint is imposed on the labor choice of an entrepreneur, her objective function is 
modified so that it explicitly includes the penalty on violating the collateral constraint. Once 
the objective function of an entrepreneur is enlarged with the penalty function, the collateral 
constraint is removed. Thus, the computational problem that I solve, in place of the problem 























 .  (23) 
The parameter governs the curvature of the penalty function and it will be a key 
parameter in the analyses below. Also, the penalty approaches zero when the collateral 
constraint is not violated (see Figure 1.1)
8
. 
Computationally, the optimality conditions (12) and (13) are replaced by  























E  ,                                                                               (25) 
where,  ))((exp
1
1 tttttt dqelw  

. 
Comparing (24) and (25) with (12) and (13), it is apparent that the approximation method 
replaces the economic variable t by .t This variable satisfies the requirement of being 
nonnegative and it approaches zero when the collateral constraint does not bind.  
The decision rules that solve this approximation to the equilibrium are obtained through a 
second-order approximation to the optimality conditions of the monetary authority. Using a 
second order approximation, rather than linearization, is necessary in order to capture the 
asymmetry inherent in the occasionally-binding collateral constraint. A second-order 
approximation also allows for the long-run mean of a variable to be different from its 
respective deterministic steady state value. The second-order approximation procedure I apply 
is the one developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). 
                                                          
7
 This function is similar to the one used by Den Haan and Ocaktan (2009). 
8
 The horizontal axis shows )(1 ttttt dqelw   . 
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1.4.2   Parameterization   
In what follows, I assume a time unit of a quarter and hence the discount factor  is set to 
0.99. Following CFP, I set the parameter to 0.5 in the benchmark calibration of the model. 
Following Iacoviello (2005) the maximum loan-to-value ratio is set 0.89 in the benchmark 
















lvcu ,                                                                                                                      
with the benchmark value of being set to 1.5. The parameter is set to 0.5, implying a labor 
supply elasticity of 2. This relatively high labor supply elasticity is needed to capture the 
volatility of total hours in a model with no extensive margin, as is the case in this paper. The 
parameter  is then calibrated so that the steady state value of l is 0.3.  
 Productivity is governed by the following AR(1) process:  
ttAAt uAlnAlnAln   )()()1()( 1 , 
with A being 0.95 in line with standard calibration of the TFP process. The innovation term 
tu is normally distributed with zero mean and a standard deviation of 007.0u . The mean 
of A is 1. 
Similarly, the elasticity of substitution t evolves according to the following process:  
ttt vlnlnln   )()()1()( 1  , 
where  is set to 0.9672 and the innovation term tv is normally distributed with zero mean 
and a standard deviation of 0729.0v , in line with Ireland (2002). The deterministic steady 
state value of t is set to 6, implying a deterministic steady state markup of 20 percent. 
The benchmark value of  is chosen so that the collateral constraint holds with equality in 

















. The implied 
value of this parameter is 889.11. There are two reasons for the assumption that the collateral 
constraint binds in the deterministic steady state. First, for the constraint not to bind in the 
deterministic steady state, the additional discount factor ( ) must be 1. In this case, however, 
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entrepreneurs accumulate enough assets so that the collateral constraint never binds. Second, 
starting from a deterministic steady state in which the collateral constraint binds enables good 
comparison with the case in which the constraint always binds (because in both cases the 
deterministic steady state is the same). Hence, any differences regarding the optimal long-run 
inflation rate in the “stochastic” steady state can be attributed to the assumption of 
occasionally-binding collateral constraint.  
The value of is obtained for 999.0 . This value of is larger than the values 
typically assumed in the literature (which usually lie between 0.95 and 0.99). There are two 
reasons for choosing a higher than usual value for . First, in models with always-binding 
constraints, this parameter is chosen so that the collateral constraint always binds. Other things 
equal, a lower value of increases the chance for the constraint to bind. This fact is also 





; the value of in the deterministic steady state is 
decreasing in . In particular, the constraint does not bind in the deterministic steady state of 
the model if 1 . Second, the accuracy of the approximation using the penalty function 
depends on the value of ; the higher   is, the closer the penalty function to obtain the L-
shape, which clearly improves the approximation (put differently, a higher  reduces the 
probability of violating the collateral constraint since any violation entails a higher penalty). 







) suggests that  depends positively on . Hence, setting a 
higher value of  is equivalent to setting a higher value of . In the robustness checks 
section, I also show the results for 99.0 .  
Finally, the parameter governing the adjustment cost of prices is set to 18.47 in my 
benchmark calibration. This value is based on the recent evidence regarding the duration of 
price contracts: Bils and Klenow (2004) show that the average duration of prices is between 
4.5 and 5.5 months; Ravenna and Walsh (2006) suggest price duration of between 2 and 3 
quarters, and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) use price duration of 2.5 quarters. I 
follow Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and set my benchmark price duration to 2.5 
quarters, but I also show the results for various price durations between 2 and 4 quarters.  
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 , with denoting the price duration. This approach follows Faia and 
Monacelli (2007). In short, the price rigidity parameter is pinned down when the slope of the 
Philips curve in a linearized model with Calvo (1983)‟s parameterization is equalized to the 
slope of the Philips curve in a linearized model with a Rotemberg (1982)‟s parameterization. 
For more details, refer to Appendix 1H.   
 
1.5     THE OPTIMAL LONG-RUN INFLATION RATE  
This section presents the main findings regarding the optimal long-run inflation rate in the 
presence of financial frictions.  
 
1.5.1   The Optimal Inflation Rate in the Deterministic Steady State  
Before turning to present the optimal long-run inflation rate, a note on the deterministic steady 
state (i.e. the state with constant technology) is in order. Given the parameter , the 
deterministic steady state of the model is invariant to the degree of price stickiness. The main 
result is that the optimal deterministic steady state of inflation is exactly zero (see Appendix 
1K for a proof). This result is as expected: in the absence of shocks, inflation is not beneficial, 
and due to the resource cost of deviations from zero inflation, the monetary authority 
completely stabilizes prices in the deterministic steady state. This is true regardless of the 
degree of price rigidity assumed (since there is no benefit from non-zero inflation but there is 
a cost of non-zero inflation for any positive value of price rigidity) and regardless of whether 
there is a labor market subsidy or not. Also, given that the deterministic steady state value of 
inflation is zero regardless of the degree of price rigidity, the deterministic steady state values 
of other variables will not vary with the degree of price rigidity.  
 
1.5.2   The Optimal Long-Run Inflation Rate 
This subsection presents the main results regarding the optimal long-run inflation rate. Before 
presenting the results allowing for occasionally-binding constraint, I comment on the optimal 
inflation rate with in the absence of financial frictions. In this case, the optimal long-run 
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inflation rate is zero regardless of the type of the underlining shock. Furthermore, inflation 
does not respond to TFP shocks in the short run (“divine coincidence”).  
The results with an occasionally-binding collateral constraint are considerably different 
(Table 1.1). In this case, optimal monetary policy deviates from full price stability in the long 
run. When the economy is subject to both shocks simultaneously, the optimal long-run 
inflation rate is around 2 percent annually in the benchmark calibration of the model. This is 
an important result, since in the real world the economy is subject to ongoing TFP and markup 
shocks, among others. The optimal inflation rate is also positive and around 1 percent for other 
empirically-plausible price durations. Hence, regardless of what the actual price duration in 
the U.S. is, the optimal inflation rate should, generally speaking, lie between 1 percent and 2 
percent annually. 
 
Price Duration (Quarters) 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 
TFP and Markup shocks  2.08 1.82 1.44 1.06 0.81 
TFP shocks only 0.63 0.54  0.43 0.32 0.22 
Markup Shocks only 1.61 1.16 0.91 0.73 0.58  
      Table 1.1: The optimal long-run inflation rate (in annualized percentages terms) for various price 
durations. 
 
Also, for plausible price durations, the optimal inflation target is falling in the degree of 
price rigidity. This result is due to the higher resource cost associated with a higher inflation 
rate, which in turn negatively affects the mean value of consumption.
9
 The nominal distortion 
seems to be less dominant for relatively low degrees of price stickiness, but becomes more 
dominant as the degree of price rigidity increases. Indeed, as the cost of price adjustment 
increases, the optimal inflation rate decreases. The optimal inflation rate reaches zero for very 
high degrees of price rigidity, but this happens outside the empirically plausible range 
of considered in this paper. 
It is also interesting to consider each shock separately in order to learn about the 
contribution of each shock in driving the results in Table 1.1. When the economy is only 
subject to TFP risk, the optimal annual long-run inflation rate is around 0.5 percent in the 
                                                          
9
 The results here are, conceptually, in line with the findings of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007); they 
show that the optimal inflation rate is highly sensitive to the degree of price rigidity. In their study, 
there is a tension between the monetary distortion, which calls for a negative inflation rate, and the 
nominal distortion, which calls for full price stability. In the current study, the tension is between the 
financial friction, which calls for a positive inflation rate, and the nominal distortion. 
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baseline calibration of the model, and it is also strictly positive for other plausible price 
durations. This result suggests that the presence of occasionally-binding constraints not only 
leads to variations in inflation following productivity shocks (as will be shown in the impulse-
response subsection below), but also implies positive inflation on average. 
Under only markup shocks, the optimal long-run inflation rate is almost twice as large as 
under TFP shocks only and decreasing in the degree of price rigidity. Hence, most of the 
positive inflation rate found above is due to markup shocks. This result is in line with the fact 
that markup shocks have stronger impact on inflation, through the Phillips curve, and they 
account for higher portion of the variability in inflation compared to TFP shocks (Ireland, 
2002). Furthermore, the existence of the collateral constraint magnifies this effect since, as 
discussed in subsection (2.3), the variable t acts as an endogenous markup shifter. 
 
1.5.3   Discussion  
When the collateral constraint binds, the Lagrange multiplier is akin to a cost-push shock that 
leads to positive inflation. When the collateral constraint does not bind, the optimal inflation 
rate is zero. Since this cost-push shock is asymmetric, in the sense that it may not be negative, 
it has a positive mean. The positive mean of the cost-push shock leads to positive mean of 
inflation. This case differs from the standard cost-push shock; the latter has a zero mean and 
introduced in a long-linearized model, which is symmetric by construction. The endogenous 
cost-push shock in this paper not only allows us to study the dynamics of inflation but also its 
long-run mean.    
 
1.5.4   The Labor Wedge  
As discussed in section 3, a binding collateral constraint generates a wedge between the 
marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption and the marginal product of 
labor, thus leading to a rise in the “labor-income tax”, as defined above. These effects can be 
counteracted by setting positive inflation.  
Figure 1.2 shows the volatility of the labor wedge for various optimal inflation rates as the 
price duration is varied between 2 and 4 quarters. For the sake of exposition, I consider the 
case with simultaneous markup and TFP shocks, but the results hold under each shock 
individually. Clearly, the volatility of the wedge at the optimum is decreasing in the optimal 
inflation rate (put differently, a lower degree of price rigidity is associated with higher optimal 
20 
 
inflation and lower volatility of the labor wedge). The Ramsey planner cannot completely 
close and/or smooth the wedge due to the lack of a sufficient set of policy instruments to 
completely and simultaneously offset all distortions along the business cycle. Since prices are 
not fully flexible, the Ramsey planner must trade off between stabilizing the wedge and 
stabilizing inflation.  
More generally, the main results of the paper can be related to the basic Ramsey theory of 
smoothing distortions over time. In this case, smoothing the labor wedge requires smoothing 
of the “labor-income tax”, which by itself can be achieved through appropriate setting of 
inflation.   
 
1.5.5   Impulse Responses  
It is useful to observe the behavior of some key variables following TFP and markup shocks in 
order to gain some insight about the mechanics of the model. Figure 1.3 displays the responses 
of some key economic aggregates under the optimal policy following negative and positive 
markup shocks of the same magnitude. Figure 1.4 shows the behavior of these variables 
following TFP shocks. The figures plot the percentage deviation of each variable from its 
deterministic steady state value. The main observation is the asymmetry in the response of 
these variables to negative and positive shocks of either type. The asymmetry is more apparent 
for the case of markup shocks, which, as we have seen above, generate a higher inflation rate.  
Following a negative one standard deviation markup shock, the fall in nominal share 
prices and the increase in good prices lead to a drop in the real price of shares (q) of about 5 
percent below their steady state value. The asymmetry in the response of net worth is mainly 
driven by the asymmetry in the real price of shares (notice the similarity of their movements) 
and, to a lesser extent, the asymmetry in the behavior of dividends. Shares (e) display little 
asymmetry (and their overall response is relatively small). Output, consumption, labor and the 
financial friction variable ( ) all display clear asymmetry under both types of shocks. The 
fall in output following a negative markup shock (i.e. an increase in the price markup) 
suggests negative co-movement between output and the desired price markup.  
Inflation behaves as expected; a negative TFP shocks leads to an increase in the marginal 
cost and consequently to an increase in inflation. This is apparent from examining condition 
(16). In this paper, the existence of the collateral constraint is the reason for inflation to 
respond to TFP shocks (i.e. the collateral constraint breaks down the “divine coincidence”). A 
negative markup shock (which is modeled here as a fall in the elasticity of substitution 
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between different types of final goods) is akin to a cost-push shock that generates inflation. 
Clearly, the response of inflation to markup shocks is considerably larger than the response of 
inflation to TFP shocks.  
 
1.6    ROBUSTNESS ANALYSES   
 
 
1.6.1   Introducing Money Demand 
Friedman (1969) suggested that a negative inflation rate is optimal in order to eliminate 
monetary distortions. In this subsection, I consider the implications of adding a money 
demand motive for the optimal inflation rate. I assume that households derive utility from 
holding money (i.e. “Money in the Utility”). Households‟ optimization, which is presented in 








cm                                                                                                                (26) 
Real money holdings is positively related to consumption and negatively related to the 
nominal interest rate. As the interest rate approaches 1, real money holding approaches infinity 
(i.e. the economy is satiated with money balances). In addition, the motive to holding money 
is affected by the parameter ; when this parameter is set to zero, the model collapses to the 
standard cashless New-Keynesian model.
10
 I set this parameter to 0.0128, implying a money-
consumption ratio of 0.7, which equals the ratio of M1to consumption in the US (Walsh, 
2003).   
The main result of the paper, that the optimal inflation rate is positive, is robust to the 
introduction of money demand. Interestingly, adding money demand only moderately affects 
the optimal long-run inflation rate. This is particularly true with relatively high price rigidity; 
in this case, price rigidity is very dominant and introducing another factor that imply non-zero 
inflation rate does not affect the optimal inflation rate significantly. More generally, the results 
                                                          
10
 The rate of time preference appears in the demand function for money because of the timing 
assumption: households derive utility from the real money balances that are available at the beginning 




M 1 ). The more patient households are, the more money they are 






m  ). 
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of this subsection suggest that the motive for a positive inflation rate introduced in this paper 




Price Duration (Quarters) 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 
TFP and Markup shocks  1.86 1.51 1.18 0.87 0.61 
TFP shocks only 0.52 0.44 0.33 0.25 0.17 
Markup Shocks only 1.25 0.98 0.77 0.61 0.47 
Table 1.2: The optimal long-run inflation rate (in annualized percentages terms) for various price 
durations with money demand ( =0.0128). 
 
1.6.2   Changing the Impatience Rate of Entrepreneurs  
I start by changing the value of the parameter and, consequently, the value of . I set 
 =0.99, which implies a subjective discount factor of entrepreneurs (  ) of about 0.98, in 




2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 
TFP and Markup shocks  1.38 1.17  0.98 0.86 0.80 
TFP shocks only 0.40 0.35 0.29 0.25 0.20 
Markup Shocks only 0.95 0.81 0.62 0.47 0.34 
         Table 1.3: The optimal long-run inflation rate (in annualized percentages terms) for various price 
durations with =0.99 and  =88.11.  
 
The results are reported in Table 1.3 and they can be summarized as follows. First, the 
optimal long-run inflation rate with the benchmark price duration (of 2.5 quarters) is positive, 
ranging between about one third percent when TFP risk is the driving force and 1.2 percent 
when both TFP and markup shocks hit the economy. Second, the optimal inflation rate when 
both shocks are allowed is around 1 percent for most of the price durations considered.  
 
1.6.3   Changing the Financial Friction Parameter 
Table 1.4 presents the results for various values of the financial friction parameter under the 
assumption that the price duration is 2.5 quarters. The optimal inflation rate is increasing 
                                                          
11
 Recently, Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2011) show that, in a model with downward nominal wage rigidity, 
sticky prices and money demand, the optimal inflation rate is positive, implying that the motive for 
positive inflation is stronger than the motive for negative inflation.   
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in for all types of shocks, suggesting that the more “severe” the financial friction is, the 
higher the optimal inflation rate. Needless to say, the optimal long-run inflation rate for =0 
is zero regardless of the source of uncertainty, and hence it is not presented below.  
 
Financial Friction Parameter 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 
TFP and Markup shocks  0.92  1.82 2.81 3.85 
TFP shocks only 0.27 0.54 0.87 1.17 
Markup Shocks only 0.58 1.16 1.77 2.54 
Table 1.4: The optimal long-run inflation rate (in annualized percentages terms) for various values 
of . 
 
1.6.4   Increasing the Sizes of the Underlying Shocks 
Blanchard, Dell‟Ariccia and Mauro (2010) suggest that “the crisis has shown that large shocks 
to the system can and do happen,” and that “maybe policymakers should therefore aim for a 
higher target inflation rate in normal times, in order to allow for more room for monetary 
policy to react to such shocks.” Motivated by this statement, in what follows, I show the 
optimal long-run inflation rate when the shocks are larger than in the baseline case. This is not 
necessarily the only way to interpret the ideas of Blanchard, Dell‟Ariccia and Mauro (2010), 
but it perhaps the simplest way to capture their suggestions. I consider the case when the 
shocks are 10 percent bigger than in the baseline calibration (i.e. 0077.0u and 




2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 
TFP and Markup shocks  2.56 2.25 1.79 1.28 1.02 
TFP shocks only 0.78 0.67 0.59 0.38 0.26 
Markup Shocks only 1.61 1.48 1.16 0.82 0.73 
Table 1.5: The optimal long-run inflation rate (in annualized percentages terms) for various price 
durations, with larger risk. 
 
  With bigger shocks, the optimal inflation rate under simultaneous TFP and markup 
shocks is roughly 2.5 percent, about half a percent higher than in the benchmark calibration. 
Overall, the optimal inflation rate is around 2 percent for price durations between 2 and 3 
quarters, which is the most empirically-relevant range. Hence, even a relatively small increase 
in the size of shocks leads to a considerable increase in the optimal inflation rate. 
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1.7     CONCLUSIONS  
The main purpose of this paper is to study the optimal long-run inflation rate in the presence 
of financial frictions. The model is a variation of the standard New Keynesian framework in 
which the hiring of labor by entrepreneurs is constrained by their collateral. This study 
modifies the assumption of always-binding collateral constraints by assuming that the 
constraint may only occasionally bind. The main result is that optimal monetary policy sets a 
strictly positive inflation rate in the long-run (i.e. in the stochastic steady state of the model). 
The optimal annual long-run inflation rate is about 2 percent when the economy faces both 
TFP and markup risks of empirically-relevant magnitudes.  
When the collateral constraint binds, the shadow value of relaxing the constraint is 
equivalent to an endogenous asymmetric cost-push shock that generates inflation. Final-good 
firms set higher prices when they observe increases in their marginal cost as a result from a 
binding collateral constraint. Since the constraint binds on average and the shadow values 
takes non-negative values only, the effects of positive Lagrange multipliers on inflation are 
not offset in periods of non-binding collateral constraints. The positive average of the 
endogenous cost-push shock leads to a positive inflation rate on average.  
 Furthermore, a binding collateral constraint distorts labor demand and thus leads to 
suboptimal level of output. Basically, a binding collateral constraint is akin to a “tax” on labor 
which can be both reduced and smoothed by setting positive inflation. More generally, a 
positive inflation rate helps in smoothing the labor wedge that arise due to the existence of the 
collateral constraint and the monopolistic power of firms. 
The current study also contributes to recent literature that attempts to justify the fact that 
central banks around the world target positive inflation rates. To my knowledge, the current 
study is the first to motivate a positive long-run inflation rate in an environment featuring 
occasionally-binding financial constraints. The recent debate about the optimal inflation rate 








Optimal Monetary Policy and Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in 
Frictional Labor Markets 
 
2.1     INTRODUCTION  
This paper studies optimal monetary policy in the presence of Downward Nominal Wage 
Rigidity (DNWR) within a labor search and matching model.
12
 When nominal wages are 
downwardly rigid, optimal monetary policy sets a strictly positive inflation rate, of about 2 
percent annually, in the long run. A strictly positive long-run inflation rate is driven by 
precautionary considerations in the expectations of adverse shocks. Positive inflation allows 
for downward real wage adjustments (thus “greasing the wheels” of the labor market) which 
eases job creation and limit the increase in unemployment following adverse shocks.  
The results of the paper are related to standard Ramsey theory of smoothing distortions (or 
“wedges”) over time. A virtually constant distortion across periods is the main insight of 
Barro (1979), in a partial equilibrium framework, and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991) in a 
quantitative general equilibrium model, among others. Recently, Arseneau and Chugh (2010) 
have developed intertemporal and static notions of efficiency in general equilibrium models 
with labor search and matching frictions. They show that the intertemporal wedge should 
indeed be smoothed, but, contrarily to the cornerstone result of tax smoothing in the Ramsey 
literature, that occurs through volatility in labor income taxes. In this paper, optimal monetary 
policy, which calls for a positive inflation rate due to DNWR, reduces the size and the 
volatility of the intertemporal wedge when prices are sticky. This fact suggests that with both 
intertemporal and nominal distortions in place, the monetary authority cannot completely 
smooth both distortions simultaneously. When prices are fully flexible, however, monetary 
policy keeps the intertemporal wedge virtually constant over the business cycle by varying the 
                                                          
12
 DNWR means not only that wage increases are more likely than wage cuts, but also that the 
distribution of wage changes is not symmetric. Nominal wages tend to increase in good times but they 
do not tend to fall proportionally in bad times, thus generating an asymmetric distribution of wage 
changes. Note that the fact that wage increases are more common than wage cuts by itself is insufficient 
evidence for the presence of DNWR; a preponderance wage increases may reflect long-term 
productivity growth or steady state (positive) inflation. 
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inflation rate. Therefore, the volatility and the size of the intertemporal wedge are both falling 
in the inflation rate as the degree of price rigidity varies.  
The results under zero-inflation policy at all dates and states are significantly different. In 
this case, the volatility of the intertemporal wedge is substantially higher; the wedge absorbs 
the shock. Similar results are obtained for labor market variables; the combination of DNWR 
and fully stable prices limit the decline in real wages considerably, thus generating 
unemployment increases and job creation declines far beyond their responses under a positive 
inflation target.    
The paper is motivated by several recent empirical studies indicating DNWR. Some of the 
most notable recent evidence on DNWR is the comprehensive work of the International Wage 
Flexibility Project (IWFP), reviewed in Dickens et al.(2007a, 2007b). Their findings indicate 
asymmetry in the distribution of nominal wage changes in 16 OECD countries, with the U.S. 
being among the countries with very high degrees of DNWR. Gottschalk (2005) shows that 
after correcting for measurement errors that typically appear in wages reported in surveys, 
only about 5% of workers experienced wage cuts during a course of a year while working for 
the same employer. Card and Hyslop (1997) show a spike at zero in the distribution of 
nominal wage changes, indicating DNWR. The size of this spike is highly correlated with 
inflation; it significantly increased in the mid 1980‟s when inflation rates fell relative to the 
1970‟s. In addition, their analysis reveals that, on average, real wages would have been lower 
by around 1% per year in the mid 1980‟s had nominal wages not been downwardly rigid. 
Using large financial corporation wage and salary data, Altonji and Devereux (2000) find that 
only 0.5% of salaried workers had salary cuts and 2.5% of hourly workers had wage 
reductions. 
The idea that positive inflation may be needed to “grease the wheels” of the labor market 
dates back at least to Tobin (1972). Following negative shocks that call for a fall in the real 
wage, Tobin (1972) suggests that setting a positive inflation rate, on one hand, and stabilizing 
nominal wages, on the other, would facilitate real wage adjustment in the presence of DNWR. 
Tobin‟s idea has gained more attention in recent years for two reasons. First, inflation rates 
have become very low in the last two decades. Clearly, DNWR is more relevant in low 
inflation environments and during recessions. Second, central banks around the world do in 
fact target positive inflation rates, either explicitly or implicitly. DNWR may create a 
precautionary motive for positive inflation: since the timing of (negative) shocks is not fully 
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predictable, the monetary authority keeps the inflation rate positive on average in order to 
“ensure” against negative shocks once they materialize.  
This study allows for staggered price setting, downwardly rigid nominal wages, and 
search and matching frictions in the labor market, the latter being consistent with positive 
unemployment in equilibrium. To model DNWR, I follow Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) and 
Fahr and Smets (2008) by using the Linex wage adjustment cost function. This function 
delivers higher costs in case of wage cuts relative to wage increases. To see the significance of 
this setup, consider the response of an economy to an adverse productivity shock. If inflation 
is high, then downward rigidity in nominal wages cannot prevent real wage drops, and hence 
inflation mitigates the potential increase in unemployment. In case of low inflation rates, 
however, DNWR may translate into Downward Real Wage Rigidity (DRWR). In this case, if 
the monetary authority seeks to keeps prices stable (due to a direct cost of adjusting prices), 
downward rigidity in real wages implies higher unemployment than in the absence of DNWR. 
If the monetary authority instead chooses to stabilize employment, it inflates in order to 
achieve the desired cut in real wages. That is, the inflation rate needed „to grease the wheels‟ 
of the economy is higher than it would be if nominal wages were not downwardly rigid. In 
short, the presence of labor market frictions may magnify the need for grease inflation if 
policy makers are trying to keep unemployment low, or it may create excessive 
unemployment when attempting to keep prices close to full stability.  
 The current study contributes to some recent literature that studies the optimal inflation 
rate in the presence of DNWR. In a frictionless labor market environment, Kim and Ruge-
Murcia (2009) show that the optimal annual grease inflation in the U.S. is positive (around 0.4 
percent). Unlike the current study, they estimate the model‟s parameters based on some 
Taylor-type rule. In an earlier version of their paper (Kim and Ruge-Murcia, 2007), the 
monetary authority chooses allocations to maximize households‟ welfare, but without 
assuming any Taylor-type rule. In that case, the optimal annual grease inflation is found to be 
1.2 percent. Fagan and Messina (2009) introduce asymmetric menu costs for wage setting and 
show that the optimal inflation rate for the U.S. ranges between 2 percent and 5 percent when 
nominal wages are downwardly rigid. The optimal inflation rate in their model depends on the 
dataset used to measure the degree of DNWR. The optimal long run inflation rate found in the 
current paper is thus more in line with the results of Fagan and Messina (2009).  
The fact that the inflation rate suggested by the current study is significantly higher than in 
Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2007, 2009), despite the use of a similar proxy for DNWR, suggests 
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that structure of the labor market in which DNWR is studied may matter for policy 
recommendations. Since the discussion is over the long-run inflation rate, these differences are 
economically significant. In addition, the average inflation rate in the United States has been 
around 2.5 percent in the last two decades. Therefore, the current study may also be seen as 
one that suggests a theoretical ground for targeting an inflation rate of around 2 percent.   
     The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the search and 
matching model economy with DNWR. Section 3 discusses the search-based efficient 
allocations and the intertemporal wedge. Section 4 describes the calibration methodology and 
the parameterization of the model. Section 5 presents the results regarding the optimal 
inflation rate. Impulse Response functions following productivity shocks are presented in 
section 6. Section 7 examines the performance of two extreme policies, full price stability and 
full employment stability, relative to optimal policy. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.2     THE MODEL ECONOMY 
Apart from the monetary authority, the economy is populated by households and 
monopolistically-competitive firms that produce differentiated products. Hiring labor by firms 
is subject to search and matching frictions. Following literature, the model embeds the search 
and matching framework of Pissarides (2000), which has become the main framework within 
which optimal monetary policy is studied in the presence of labor market frictions.
13
 Each firm 
faces asymmetric adjustment cost for nominal wages that implies higher costs of cutting 
nominal wages relative to increasing nominal wages by the same magnitude. Changing prices 
by each firm is subject to a direct resource cost. The model allows for variations in total hours 
along both the extensive and the intensive margin.  
 
2.2.1   Households  
The economy is populated by a representative household which consists of family members of 
measure one. At each date t a household member can be in either of two states: employed or 
unemployed and searching for a job. Employed individuals are of measure tn and the 
unemployed are of measure tu , where tt nu  1 , as conventional in the literature.  
                                                          
13
 Note that my model assumes no idiosyncratic shocks, unlike, for example, Mortensen and Pissarides 
(1994).       
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Following the assumptions of consumption insurance in Merz (1995) and Andolfatto 
(1996), all family members in this household have the same consumption. The disutility of 
work is assumed to be the same for all employed individuals and the value of non-work is the 










t hvncuE   ,                                                                                                      (1) 
where 1 is the standard subjective discount factor, 0E is the expectation operator , tc is the 
composite consumption index, th denotes hours per worker, )(u is the period utility function 
from consumption and )( thv is the period disutility function from supplying labor. These 


































As standard in New Keynesian models, consumption ( tc ) is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of 

















djcc jtt ,                                                                                                                (2) 
where 1 is the elasticity of substitution between two varieties of final goods. In line with 
standard Dixit-Stiglitz based NK models, the optimal allocation of expenditures on each 




























djPP jtt is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index that results from cost minimization. 
























  11)1( ,                                                               (4) 
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where b stands for unemployment benefits, tB denotes nominal bonds, tW is the nominal 
wage, tR is the nominal gross interest rate on bonds, tP  is the aggregate price level, tT are net 
transfers and t stands for profits from the ownership of firms. 



























 denotes the gross price inflation rate. 
 
2.2.2   Firms in the Labor Market 
There is a continuum of measure one of monopolistically-competitive firms. Each firm j hires 
labor as the only input and produces differentiated products using the following linear 
technology  
)( jtjttjt hfnzy  ,                                                                                                                    (6) 
with tz denoting aggregate productivity, which is common to all firms, jtn is employment at 
time t in firm j, and jth is hours per worker supplied by each worker at the firm. The pricing of 
a firm is subject to a quadratic adjustment cost as in Rotemberg (1982), expressed in units of 
the final output.  
Hiring workers by each firm is subject to search and matching costs. Each period firms 
post vacancies and they meet unemployed workers searching for jobs. Nominal wages and 
hours per worker are determined in a Nash bargaining process between workers and firms as 
will be outlined later. As noted by Krause and Lubik (2007), the assumption of quadratic 
adjustment cost and symmetry among firms allows for integrating price decisions and 
employment decisions in the same firm.     
 Each firm faces an asymmetric wage adjustment cost function that involves a higher cost 
in case of a nominal wage cut compared to a nominal wage increase.
14
 In particular, following 
                                                          
14
 The assumption that firms pay the adjustment costs of wages is without loss of generality. In this 
model, the wage rate is determined through bargaining between firms and workers. Therefore, it is not 
very clear who should pay the cost of adjusting wages. I assume that firms entail these costs without 
loss of generality. Note that this assumption has no effect on the economy-wide resource constraint.  
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Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), the real wage adjustment cost per employed individual is given 


























.                                                            (7) 
For any positive value of , the cost of cutting nominal wages by a specific amount is 
higher than the cost of increasing wages by the same amount. Also, as   approaches zero, 
this function approaches the quadratic adjustment cost and hence enables comparison with the 
symmetric adjustment function. In the other extreme, as   approaches infinity, this function 
becomes L-shaped implying that nominal wages cannot fall. Naturally, this parameter will 
have special significance in my analyses, particularly regarding the optimal long-run inflation 
rate.  
Posting a vacancy v entails a cost of  for a firm. Matches between vacant jobs and 




  1),( ttmtt vuuvm ,                                                                                                             (8) 
where m is a scaling parameter that reflects the efficiency of the matching process. Labor 
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)(  . Using the properties of the matching function it can be written as 
  tmtq )(  ,                                                                                                                     (10) 
which is decreasing in labor market tightness. Intuitively, the higher the ratio of vacancies to 
unemployment, the lower the probability for a specific vacancy to be filled. Similarly, the job 








)(  ) can be written as 
                                                          
15
 The variable u measures the number of unemployed individuals at time t. The corresponding 
unemployment rate is given by 
1)1)(1(1  tt uur . 
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  1)( tmtp ,                                                                                                                    (11) 
and hence it increases in tighter labor markets. Finally, employment in each firm evolves 
according the following law of motion: 
 ),()1(1 tjtjtjt uvmnn   ,                                                                                            (12)       
with  denoting the separation rate from a match. Using the expression for the job-filling rate 
and the law if motion of employment can also be written as 
))()(1(1 tjtjtjt qvnn   .                                                                                              (13)  
In this formulation, I assume that a match formed at time t starts to produce at time t+1 
given that it survived exogenous separations.  
Each firm chooses its price vacancies and employment for next period to maximize the 




































































 ,   (14) 
subject to the sequence of laws of motion of employment, and the : 
))()(1(1 tjtjtjt qvnn   ,                                                                                               (15) 















)(  .                                                                                                      (16) 
Households are assumed to own the firms, and hence firms discount next period‟s profits 





  , where t is the Lagrange 
multiplier on the households budget constraint.   
Let jt  be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the employment law of motion 
(equation 15), and jt be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the output constraint 
(equation 16). The multiplier jt measures the contribution of one additional unit of output to 
the revenue of the firm, and it equals, in equilibrium, the real marginal cost of the firm. 
Imposing symmetry across firms, and assuming that all workers supply the same number of 











































 , (17) 
and, 
0)()1(  ttq   .                                                                                                    (18) 




























































w  ) is the real wage. Thus, in equilibrium, the firm equates the vacancy-creation 
cost to the discounted expected value of profits from the match. As the term in brackets makes 
clear, the flow profit to a firm from a match equals output net of wage payments and costs of 
adjusting wages.
16
 This condition is also referred to as the free-entry condition for posting 
vacancies.  
By taking first order condition with respect to the price jtP and assuming symmetry among 
firms (since they all set the same price in equilibrium), we get the following price Philips 
































 .                                        (20) 
This equation shows that the current inflation rate is an implicit function of the expected 
inflation rate and the real marginal cost. This equation collapses in the case of fully flexible 
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    The LHS is the cost of posting a vacancy. The RHS shows the discounted expected value of profits 
from a given match. The firm enjoys profits from this match in case of being filled (which occurs with 
probability )( tq  ) and surviving exogenous separation (which occurs with probability )1(  ). We 
can use the last term in the RHS to iterate forward and hence get the expected PDV of profits. In short, 











the inverse of the gross price markup.  
 
2.2.3   Nash Bargaining 
As is typical in the literature, wage payments and hours per employed individual are 
determined by Nash bargaining between firms and individuals. I follow Thomas (2008) and 
Arseneau and Chugh (2008) among others by assuming that bargaining is over nominal wages 
tW rather than real wages tw (as typically has been the assumption). This assumption allows 
focusing on nominal wages, which are the subject of this study. To have a good notion for 
downward wage rigidity one should focus on the determination of nominal wages, since if 
bargaining is over real wages, downward real wage rigidity will have no implications for 
monetary policy. As discussed in Fahr and Smets (2008), Downward Real Wage Rigidity 
means than nominal wages are indexed to inflation, which in case of full indexation, implies a 
zero greasing inflation rate. Put differently, the fact that real wages cannot fall following 
negative shocks regardless of the inflation rate makes grease inflation irrelevant. Given that 
deviation from price stability is costly, optimal policy will fully stabilize prices. This renders 
the discussion here less relevant.  
Firms and workers split the surplus of a match according to their bargaining power. The 














































,                                      (21) 
where the disutility from work is expressed in terms of the marginal utility of consumption 
(and hence is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor). 
Therefore, the asset value for an employed individual is the difference between his current 
wage payment and the disutility from labor together with the discounted continuation value of 
staying employed or becoming unemployed next period, with the two events taking place with 
probabilities )1(  and  , respectively.  






































1 ))1)((1()1)((   ,              (22) 
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which equals unemployment benefits plus the continuation value. The latter is the weighted 
sum of the values of staying unemployed next period (which occurs with 
probability ))1)((1(   tt q ) and becoming employed (which occurs with 
probability )1)((  ttq ).  


































































 .  (23) 
Therefore, the value of each match equals the flow value of its product net of wage 
payments and wage adjustment costs plus the continuation value of that match in case of 
surviving separation.  







t VVV  ,                                                                                                               (24) 
where   denotes the bargaining power of workers (and their share in the match surplus). In 
equilibrium, the value of posting a vacancy is zero and hence the threat point of firms is set to 












































VV .                    (25) 
Denoting the effective bargaining power of workers by t , the first-order condition with 



























































If nominal wages are costless to adjust, t will be exactly equal to  .
17
 The wage 
adjustment cost drives a wedge between the effective and the ex-ante bargaining powers. Also, 
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=1, and t = . 
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since the parameter   appears in the expression for Ft , the presence of DNWR plays here a 
role in determining the effective bargaining power of workers. As   increases, the cost of 
increasing wages becomes very low and hence the effective bargaining power approaches its 
ex-ante value, .  
Combining the job creation condition (19) with the asset value for the firm from a match 






















   .                  (27) 
It is evident that the more downwardly rigid nominal wages, the lower the value to a firm 
from a given match.  Also, substituting the expression for 
V
tV yields the equation 






































































    The current wage is affected by the cost of adjusting nominal wages, the outside option (b), 
the disutility from labor and the continuation value of the worker being employed.
18
  
Finally, the equation characterizing the determination of hours per employed individual is 
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Therefore, the wage paid to a worker is a weighted average of the value of his output (net of wage 
adjustment costs), the value of his outside options, the disutility of work, and the present discounted 
value of his expected gain from search. In the absence of wage adjustment costs, this expression 















)1()(  . 
Hence, the real wage of a worker is equal to the share  of the revenue and saving of hiring costs, and 


















2.2.4   The Private Sector Equilibrium 
The equilibrium conditions of the private sector are the consumption Euler equation (5) 
describing intertemporal choices, the law of motion for employment (13), the job creation 
condition (19), the price Philips curve (20), the wage setting equation (28), the hours 
determination equation (29) , the resource constraint of the economy given by  
















ttttttt hznnuchzn ,  (30) 
the constraint on unemployment 
 tt nu  1 ,                                                                                                                             (31) 












,                                                                                                                             (32) 
 which is typically introduced in sticky price and sticky nominal wage models. As explained in 
Chugh (2006) and Arseneau and Chugh (2008), this identity does not hold trivially in the case 




Note that in condition (30), I substitute for tv using the expression for labor market 
tightness ( ttt uv  ).   
Definition 1: Given the exogenous processes },{ tt zR , the private sector equilibrium is a 
sequence of allocations },,,,,,,,{ wttttttttt wunhc  that satisfy the equilibrium conditions 
(5), (13), (19), (20) and (28)-(32). 
 
2.2.5   The Optimal Monetary Policy Problem 
The monetary authority in this economy seeks to maximize the household‟s welfare subject to 
the resource constraint and the first order conditions of individuals and firms (see Appendix 
                                                          
19
 This constraint also appears in the study of Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000).  
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2B for the full optimal monetary policy problem). Formally, given the exogenous process for 
technology tz , the monetary authority chooses },,,,,,,,{
w
ttttttttt wunhc  in order to 
maximize (1) subject to (13), (19), (20) and (28)-(32). 
 
2.3     SEARCH EFFICIENCY AND THE INTERTEMPORAL WEDGE 
In the basic Ramsey theory of public finance, the planner aims at smoothing distortions (or 
“wedges”) over the business cycle. This is the main insight of the partial-equilibrium “tax-
smoothing” result of Barro (1979). Chari,Christano and Kehoe (1991) show that this result is 
carried over to a general equilibrium framework. Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) established 
that the optimal capital income tax in the steady state is zero and that there are no 
intertemporal distortions. Albanesi and Armenter (2007) generalize this idea and show that, in 
the deterministic steady state of a general class of optimal policy problems, it is optimal to 
achieve zero intertemporal distortion. More recently, Arseneau and Chugh (2010) have shown, 
within a labor search and matching model, that the Ramsey planner aims indeed at smoothing 
intertemporal wedges, but that is not mapped into tax smoothing. In the current paper, the only 
“tax” available to the Ramsey planner is the inflation rate. Hence, I also examine whether the 
notion of “wedge smoothing” applies to the current setup, and if does, how that is mapped into 
smoothing the inflation rate.  





















































 .                                           (34) 
These definitions are borrowed from the recent work of Arseneau and Chugh (2010). 
IMRS is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption choices across 
periods (put differently, the ratio of marginal utilities at time t and time t+1). IMRT stands for 
the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation, and it measures the increase in consumption 
at time t+1 as a result of a forgone one unit of consumption at time t.  
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As shown in Appendix 2C, efficiency requires IMRT=IMRS for all t. The efficiency 











































































 ,                      (35) 





















































































































































Comparing the square brackets in condition (35) with the square brackets in condition (36) 
implicitly defines the “intertemporal wedge”. By comparing (35) with (36), sufficient 
conditions for efficiency are: nominal wages are fully flexible or fully stabilized (i.e.
W
t 1 =0, 
and hence  1t ), the Hosios condition holds (   ), the unemployment benefits are zero 
(b=0), and no monopolistic power in the final-good sector (which implies 1t =1). See 
Appendix 2D for further details.  
The fact that the adjustment cost of nominal wages appears in the term defining the 
intertemporal wedge is of special significance. When nominal wages are not fully flexible (or 
not fully stabilized), they induce a direct effect on the intertemporal wedge. But, nominal 
wage rigidity has also an indirect effect on the intertemporal wedge, which happens through 
the deviation of the effective bargaining power of workers ( t ) from its ex-ante value ( ). 
This is well reflected in the last term of the numerator of condition (36). The fact that nominal 
wages are downwardly rigid only magnifies the two effects in periods of downturn. Hence, 
“smoothing” nominal wages is one way to smooth the wedge over time. Setting a positive 
inflation rate lead, at least partially, to smoothing nominal wages, and hence the intertemporal 
wedge. This can be easily seen by substituting for the real marginal cost ( t ) using the 






2.4     CALIBRATION 
The first subsection discusses the parameterization of the model, and the second subsection 
presents some discussion about the calibration methodology applied in this study. 
 
2.4.1   Parameterization:   
There are two groups of parameters. The values of the first group will be set to conventional 
values in the existing literature. The second group of parameters, namely the adjustment cost 
parameters of prices and nominal wages and the measure for DNWR, are obtained to match 
certain data moments. I follow this approach since most parameters of the model are 
commonly used in existing literature and hence there is no necessity to estimate them. The 
adjustment costs parameters will thus be consistent with commonly-used values for other 
parameters.  




















nhcu   
I set the parameter  to 2. The parameter  is set at 2, implying a labor supply elasticity 
of 0.5.
20
 I then calibrate  such that the SS level of hours is 0.3, as is conventional in literature. 
I assume a time unit of a quarter and hence the discount factor  is set to 0.99. 
Output per worker has diminishing returns in hours per worker, as follows:  

tt hhf )( , 
where is set to 2/3 implying a labor share of output of about 67%, in line with literature.      
The matching process between vacancies and unemployed individuals is governed by the 
following constant return-to-scale function:  
  1),( ttmtt vuuvm  
The parameter measures the elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment and is 
set here to 0.40 in line with several studies (e.g. Arseneau and Chugh, 2008 and Faia, 2008). 
The parameter m measures the efficiency of the matching process and is calibrated in my 
benchmark case to be 0.658. This value has been calibrated assuming that the probability to 
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 Previous studies considered elasticity between 0.1 and 1, corresponding to values of 10 and 1 for  , 
respectively. I choose here an intermediate value for the elasticity of hours.  
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fill a vacancy is 0.7 and the probability to find a job is 0.6, as conventional in the literature. 
The implied steady state value of labor market tightness is 6/7. I therefore calibrate the value 
of posting vacancies to match this SS level of ; the value obtained for  is 0.413.  Also, 
following Shimer (2005) and Arseneau and Chugh (2008), among others, I set the quarterly 
separation rate  at 0.10. 
As is standard in literature, I assume that the Hosios (1990) condition holds and hence that 
the Nash bargaining power of workers is equal to the contribution of an unemployed 
individual to the match (i.e. )  . As shown in Hosios (1990), this condition guarantees the 
efficiency of the matching process. 
Productivity is governed by the following AR(1) process:  
ttzt zlnzln    )()( 1  
z is set to 0.95 in line with previous literature. The innovation term t is normally distributed 
with zero mean and a standard deviation of 007.0 , as typically assumed in the literature.  
The parameters governing the adjustment cost functions of prices and nominal wages (i.e. 
p ,  and  ) are estimated using the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM).  In my 
baseline calibration, I choose parameters to match the standard deviations of consumption, 
wage inflation, price inflation, real wages, hours per employed individual and employment. 
However, as a robustness check, I also redo my work using other groups of moments to 
match. The resulting parameter estimates in my baseline calibration are 9.26
p , 
3.87 and 3.2567 . 
 
2.4.2   Computational Solution 
The main purpose of this paper is to address optimal monetary policy in the presence of 
asymmetries in the adjustment of nominal wages. Linearization cannot account for this 
asymmetry since, by construction, it eliminates the asymmetries of the model. Therefore, I 
need to apply second-order approximations for the monetary authority‟s equilibrium 
conditions. A second-order approximation allows for the unconditional mean of the variable in 
the “stochastic steady state” to be different from its deterministic steady state value and to be 
affected by the size of the underlying shock. Finally, I apply the second order approximation 




2.5     THE OPTIMAL INFLATION RATE 
 This section presents the main findings regarding optimal monetary policy under search and 
matching frictions in the presence of downward rigidity in nominal wages. I first discuss the 
deterministic steady state and then turn to the dynamics of the model.   
 
2.5.1   The Optimal Inflation Rate in the Deterministic Steady State 
The deterministic steady state of the model is invariant to the degrees of price stickiness, wage 
stickiness and asymmetry in the adjustment of nominal wages. In the absence of shocks, 
inflation is not beneficial, and due to the direct cost of deviation from complete price stability, 
the monetary authority completely stabilizes prices (and nominal wages) in the deterministic 
steady state. This fact is unrelated to whether wages are flexible or rigid.    
 
2.5.2   The Optimal Long-Run Inflation Rate  
In this subsection I discuss the dynamics of the model. As a benchmark, I first examine the 
case with fully flexible wages (i.e. 0 ). When wages are costless to adjust, and prices are 
rigid, optimal monetary policy fully stabilizes prices (Panel I, Table 2.1). In this case, all the 
adjustment of real wages occurs through instantaneous adjustment of nominal wages. When 
nominal wages are rigid, but the adjustment cost function is symmetric ( 0 , 0  ), the 
optimal grease inflation rate is zero (Panel I, Table 2.1): in the latter case, the symmetry of the 
wage adjustment cost eliminates the precautionary motive for inflation.
21
 
This is the main result of the paper is reported in panel III. When nominal wages are 
downwardly rigid ( 0 ), optimal monetary policy deviates from full price stability in the 
long run; the optimal annual long-run inflation rate is slightly above 2 percents. This is an 
important result for, at least, two reasons. First, the optimal inflation rate is significantly 
higher than in a model with neoclassical labor markets (as for example in the work of Kim and 
Ruge-Murcia, 2007). This fact suggests that the nature of the labor market in which DNWR is 
studied can be important for policy recommendations. Second, the optimal inflation rate 
suggested by this paper is only about half a percent lower than the average annual inflation 
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 In both cases, the 95 percent confidence intervals include the zero. The confidence interval for the 
case with fully flexible wages is (-0.0057, 0.0020), and the confidence interval for the case with a 
symmetric adjustment cost of wages is (-0.0193, 0.0221).  Hence, the hypothesis that the optimal 
inflation rate is zero cannot be rejected in either of the two cases.  
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rate in the U.S. during the last two decades. Hence, the current environment can be seen as one 
that justifies an inflation rate of more than 2 percents as observed in U.S. data.  
 
 I II III 
 
Fully Flexible Wages 
( 0 ) 
Rigid Wages,  
Symmetric Adjustment 
Cost ( 0 ) 
Rigid Wages,  
Asymmetric Adjustment  
Cost ( 3.2567 ) 
x 
x  x  x  x  x  x  
  -0.0018 0.0385 0.0014 0.5605 2.1505 3.7184 
w  0.0190 2.0317 0.0003 0.1362 2.1204 2.9052 
 y 0.3782 1.1189 0.3782 1.1718 0.3801 1.3507 
 c 0.3229 1.0238 0.3229 0.9287 0.3237 1.1530 
 h 0.3000 0.2596 0.3000 0.3021 0.3009 0.4702 
 w 1.1178 2.7432 1.1176 1.9594 1.1132 2.4304 
 u 0.1563 1.7040 0.1563 1.9656 0.1583 3.6871 
ur 0.0626 1.8933 0.0626 2.1840 0.0648 4.0968 
 v 0.1339 1.7194 0.1339 1.9965 0.1361 4.1440 
  0.8576 2.9148 0.8576 3.3697 0.8859 7.4962 
Table 2.1: Simulated moments- Second order approximation. 3.87 and 9.26p .                                                                                                                       
x - the mean of the variable. x - the standard deviation of the variable (in percents).                                           
Price inflation and wage inflation are presented in annualized terms. 
The model does well in accounting for the volatilities of key macroeconomic aggregates 
(e.g. output, consumption and hours per worker). The standard deviations of labor market 
variables (i.e. vacancies, unemployment, unemployment rate, and labor market tightness) are 
well below their values in actual U.S. data. The failure of the labor search and matching model 
to account for the true volatilities of labor market aggregates is well known in the literature 
since the seminal paper of Shimer (2005). The model, however, manages to capture the 
volatilities of v and u relative to the volatility of  as shown in data. The model also captures 
the relative volatilities of v and ur, and the level of the unemployment rate (around 6.25 
percent, in line with the literature). Finally, the model with DNWR better accounts for the 
volatilities of these three variables compared to the model with fully flexible nominal wages 







2.5.3   Discussion- The Optimal Inflation Rate and Intertemporal Wedge 
Smoothing 
The strictly positive long-run inflation rate is due to precautionary behavior by the monetary 
authority. Since the timing (and magnitude) of adverse shocks is not fully predictable, a 
positive inflation rate over time allows for real wage adjustments when nominal wages are 
downwardly rigid, and hence it eases job creation and limits the increase in unemployment.  
This result can also be rationalized by considering basic Ramsey theory of “wedge 
smoothing”. As discussed in section (3), DNWR acts, directly and indirectly, towards 
generating a wedge between the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the 
intertemporal marginal rate of transformation, thus positioning the economy away from the 
efficient state. Therefore, the Ramsey planner acts in a manner that aims at closing this source 
of distortion, at least partially. This happens through stabilizing nominal wages to the 
maximum possible extent. Holding a positive inflation rate over time serves in achieving the 
real wage adjustments with less nominal wage adjustments and hence lower distortion.  
The role of inflation in smoothing the intertemporal wedge is well documented in Figure 
2.1. The figure shows the standard deviation of the intertemporal wedge for various optimal 
inflation rates obtained under different values of the price rigidity  parameter (
p ). Clearly, 
the volatility of the intertemporal wedge is falling with the optimal annual long-run inflation 
rate. This finding supports the earlier expectations that positive inflation helps in reducing the 
volatility of the intertemporal wedge.  
In the standard Ramsey theory, the intertemporal wedge should be completely smoothed 
over time. This is not the result here for the following reasons. First, the monetary authority 
does not have enough set of instruments to completely and simultaneously stabilize all 
distortions, including the intertemporal distortion, over the business cycle. Hence, the 
monetary authority chooses to spread the distortions across all margins. This is a well-know 
result in the literature (Dupor, 2002). Second, deviations from zero inflation rate are costly, 
and hence the monetary authority trades-off between stabilizing the inflation rate and 
stabilizing the intertemporal wedge through stabilization of nominal wages. The convexity of 
the adjustment costs of nominal wages and prices makes it not optimal to fully stabilize one of 
the two variables and allow for the other variable to vary.  
It is interesting to contrast these findings with the results under a policy that commits to a 
zero-inflation rate at all dates. Figure 2.3 shows that standard deviation of the intertemporal 
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wedge for various degrees of DNWR ( ) under both optimal policy and a zero-inflation 
policy. The standard deviation of the wedge is considerably smaller under a positive inflation 
rate policy than under a zero-inflation policy, particularly for the relevant values of (which 
are around 2600 given a benchmark calibration value of 2567.3). Moreover, as the degree of 
DNWR increases, the difference between the standard deviations becomes bigger. Hence, 
inflation has a more significant role in smoothing the intertemporal wedge as nominal wages 
become more downwardly rigid.  
The intertemporal wedge is almost entirely smoothed when prices are fully flexible 
(Figure 2.4).
22
 In this case, the monetary authority has more room for policy actions that 
stabilize the intertemporal wedge. Put differently, the monetary authority faces less trade-offs 
in conducting policy. Indeed, with fully flexible prices, the intertemporal wedge is essentially 
smoothed over time, regardless of the degree of asymmetry in the adjustment cost of nominal 
wages.  
Figure 2.5 also helps to shed light on this result. The figure is drawn under the assumption 
that the monetary authority commits to a certain inflation target at all dates and states.  The 
figure shows the mean levels and the standard deviations of unemployment rate and vacancies 
as a function of the inflation target (ranging between zero and 3 percents). The unemployment 
rate drops significantly in the range between zero inflation rate and about 2 percents. On the 
other hand, vacancy posting increases significantly in this range. The standard deviations of 
both variables fall considerably as the target increases in this range. Basically, two important 
conclusions can be obtained from this figure. First, inflation is more important in “greasing” 
the wheels of the labor market for low inflation rates, as expected. In addition, the trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment is more significant for lower inflation rates. Second, the 
marginal “benefit” from increasing the inflation rate approaches zero as we move beyond, 
approximately, 2 percents. This observation just supports an optimal inflation rate of about 2 
percents.    
 
2.5.4   The Optimal Inflation Rate- Sensitivity Analyses  
The goal of this subsection is to check whether the main result of this paper, an inflation rate 
of about 2 percents holds once other empirical moments to match are chosen. The results are 
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 In fact, for inflation to be determinate, prices in the current setup cannot be fully flexible. Hence, 





shown in Table 2.2. In general, I choose here two different cases: in the first, I allow for only 3 
moments to match (and so the number of moments equals the number of parameters). In the 
second, the number of moments exceeds the number of parameters.   
 








c, h, w, 
w and n 
The Standard 
Deviations of 








w and  
  1.8016 1.8706 2.2324 2.3757 2.4372 
w  1.8256 1.8645 2.1971 2.4201 2.4359 
Table 2.2: Simulated moments- Second order approximation. Each entry shows the annualized mean of 
the variable.  
 
The results show that the long run inflation rate is usually around 2 percents, ranging from 
about 1.80 percents to about 2.44 percents. The higher inflation rate in the latter case (where 
the standard deviation of labor market tightness is targeted) is due to the fact that in order to 
account for the high standard deviation of labor market tightness, a higher   is needed. This 
in turn leads to a higher inflation rate.  
In general, the analyses in this subsection confirm my earlier result; the optimal long run 
inflation rate in a model with DNWR and labor market frictions is about 2 percent. In 
addition, all cases considered the optimal grease inflation rate is considerably higher than the 
optimal grease inflation rate in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2007, 2009). Hence, the nature of the 
labor market in which DNWR is imbedded seems to matter for policy analysis.  
 
2.6     IMPULSE RESPONSES 
This section describes, under optimal policy, the behavior of the economy following negative 
and positive productivity shocks of the same magnitude (the size of the shock is one standard 
deviation of the shock to TFP). Figure 2.6 shows the behavior of the main variables of interest 
under the presence of DNWR. These variables display asymmetry in their responses to 
negative and positive shocks, particularity those of big sizes (a big shock is defined here as of 
two standard deviation size).  
Nominal wages do not almost fall following a negative shock, but they increase 
considerably following a positive shock. The asymmetry in the response of nominal wages is 
more significant the bigger the size of the shock. Price inflation increases considerably 
following a negative shock, but it falls only slightly below its SS level following a positive 
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shock of the same magnitude. This finding confirms the role of inflation in greasing the 
wheels of the labor market following negative shocks under DNWR.  
Unemployment displays asymmetry in the response to productivity shocks and it is more 
persistent following big negative shocks. The asymmetry in unemployment is less than the 
asymmetry in price inflation and wage inflation. This fact is due to less asymmetry in the 
behavior of real wages: since prices and nominal wages almost complement each other 
following shocks, the fall in real wages following a negative shock (which almost entirely 
occurs through the increase in prices) is roughly the same, in absolute terms, as the increase in 
real wages following a positive shock (in which case the adjustment is through both prices and 
nominal wages). Hence, the asymmetry in unemployment is smaller.  
Other variables also display asymmetry in their response to negative and positive shocks. 
The asymmetry in the behaviors of vacancies and unemployment explain the asymmetry in the 
behavior of labor market tightness. Finally, there seems to be little asymmetry in the behavior 
of output and consumption. This is perhaps due to the symmetry in the productivity shock and 
the relatively small degree of asymmetry in unemployment.  
The behavior of the economy following shocks under the presence of DNWR and its 
behavior under symmetric adjustment cost function are also compared. Figure 2.7 displays the 
response of the economy to positive and negative shocks in the absence of DNWR. As 
expected, all variables display symmetry in their response to positive and negative shocks.   
Figure 2.8 shows the response of the economy to a negative shock in the three possible 
cases: fully flexible nominal wages, symmetric nominal wage adjustment cost and DNWR. 
When nominal wages are fully flexible, not only that inflation is set at zero on average (recall 
Table 2.1), but inflation is also irresponsive on impact. Given that prices are costly to adjust 
and nominal wages are fully flexible, nominal wages fall instantaneously to allow for the drop 
in real wages. The role of DNWR is clearly revealed in this case: the response of inflation to a 
negative shock under downwardly nominal wages is significantly larger than its response to a 
negative shock when the adjustment cost is symmetric.  
The fall in real wages under fully flexible nominal wages is considerably larger than under 
wage rigidity (of either type). Unemployment increase only slightly under fully flexible wages 
and it displays less persistence. In addition, the fall on vacancies and labor market tightness is 
considerably smaller under fully flexible nominal wages than under rigid wages. The larger 
falls in unemployment and hours under rigid wages than under fully flexible nominal wages 
lead to larger drops in output and consumption. In overall, and as expected, the case of 
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symmetrically rigid wages is an intermediate case between the cases of fully flexible nominal 
wages and downwardly rigid nominal wages.   
The discussion on optimal monetary policy can be summarized as follows. Under fully 
flexible nominal wages, inflation does not respond to negative shocks and it is always set at 
zero. When nominal wages are rigid and the adjustment cost function is symmetric, inflation 
responds to shocks but it is kept at zero on average. Finally, when nominal wages are 
downwardly rigid, the response of inflation is stronger on impact and monetary policy 
deviates, on average, from complete price stability.  
 
2.7     PRICE STABILIZATION VS. UNEMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION  
This section considers the performance of two extreme polices relative to optimal policy. In 
the first case, the monetary authority commits to full stabilization of prices at all dates and 
states (to which I refer as strict inflation targeting or zero-inflation policy). In the second, the 
monetary authority commits to stabilize unemployment at its steady state level. 
When the monetary authority strictly targets zero inflation, unemployment responds more 
strongly than under the optimal policy (Figure 2.9). The initial response of unemployment for 
a shock of one standard deviation size is significantly larger than under optimal policy. The 
peak on the response, after about 3 quarters, is approximately three times as large under strict 
inflation targeting as under optimal policy. In addition, unemployment displays considerably 
more persistence under strict inflation targeting. In either case, unemployment displays the 
typical humped-shaped pattern that has been observed in previous studies with labor market 
frictions (e.g. Blanchard and Gali, 2008; Krause and Lubik, 2007).  
Wage inflation falls more under strict inflation targeting than under constant 
unemployment and optimal policy (although in either case, the fall in wage inflation is 
relatively small due to the presence of DNWR). Since prices are fully stabilized, nominal 
wages must fall by more than under the optimal policy in order to allow for real wage 
adjustments. Note that the behavior of nominal wages under the constant unemployment 
regime is almost the same as under the optimal policy.  
When the monetary authority fully stabilizes unemployment, inflation displays a stronger 
response than under the optimal policy. Intuitively, if unemployment cannot increase, prices 
must increase by more in order to generate the larger required decline in real wages. However, 
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it is interesting to notice that after about 4 quarters, the behavior of inflation under the constant 
unemployment regime is similar to its behavior under optimal policy.  
The most muted decline in real wages is under strict inflation targeting (which is a result 
of both DNWR and zero inflation), while the strongest decline is under the constant 
unemployment regime (because nominal wages remain almost unchanged, while inflation 
displays a larger increase than under optimal policy). This result is as expected since, when the 
monetary authority commits to fully stable employment, real wages must fall significantly so 
that the economy can adjust to the negative productivity shock.  
Following the behavior of unemployment, the largest drop in output occurs under strict 
inflation targeting.  Output reaches its trough after about 3 quarters, when unemployment 
peaks (and hours per worker reach their lowest point). The behavior of consumption is similar 
to the behavior of output, while the largest decline in labor market tightness occurs under strict 
inflation targeting, as vacancies fall strongly and unemployment increases considerably.  
These responses suggest that strict inflation targeting is far from being optimal under 
DNWR. Full stabilization of prices in the presence of DNWR limits the ability of the economy 
to adjust to adverse shocks. Stabilizing unemployment, however, delivers responses similar to 
those under optimal policy. Welfare analyses show that welfare under a zero-inflation policy 
is lower by roughly 8.48 percent than welfare under the optimal policy. Welfare under full 
stabilization of unemployment is lower by only 0.30 percent than welfare under optimal 
policy.  
 The results of this section are in line with recent studies that suggest the need for 
deviations from full price stability. Blanchard and Gali (2008) show that strict inflation 
targeting delivers a welfare loss which is more than twice as large as under full stabilization of 
unemployment , and more than four times as large as under the optimal policy. My results 
here suggest higher welfare loss under strict inflation targeting than in Blanchard and Gali 
(2008), which can possibly be attributed to DNWR that makes zero-inflation policy even more 
undesirable. Faia (2008) suggests that, in the presence of real wage rigidities, the optimal 
Taylor-type rule should respond to unemployment alongside with inflation. Thomas (2008) 
also argues for incomplete stabilization of prices following shocks when nominal wages are 
rigid. Although these studies and the current one may differ in their focus (i.e. the type of 
wage rigidity), they all suggest that optimal policy should deviate from price stability 
following shocks. This study shows that, due to precautionary behavior, DNWR also leads to 
a significant deviation from full price stability on average.  
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2.8     CONCLUSIONS  
This paper studies the optimal long-run inflation rate within a labor search and matching 
framework in the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity. When nominal wages are 
downwardly rigid, the optimal long-run inflation rate is around 2.0 percent. Optimal monetary 
policy deviates from full price stability to allow for real wage adjustments, particularly 
following adverse shocks, which promotes job creation and prevents an excessive increase in 
unemployment. 
The results of this paper are related to Ramsey theory of smoothing wedges over time. In 
this study, the concern is over the “intertemporal wedge”, which is defined here, generally 
speaking, as the deviation of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution from the 
intertemporal marginal rate of transformation. Importantly, the asymmetric adjustment cost of 
nominal wages is part of this wedge. By setting a positive inflation rate, the Ramsey planner 
acts towards smoothing the intertemporal wedge and hence taking the economy closer to the 
efficient allocation. Indeed, the results suggest that the size and volatility of the wedge are 
both falling in the inflation rate as the degree of price rigidity is varied. The intertemporal 
wedge is virtually constant over time when prices are fully flexible.  
Committing to a zero inflation rate over the business cycle has been found to perform the 
worst among other alternatives. Under a zero-inflation policy, the volatility of the 
intertemporal wedge is significantly higher (about 4 times as large as under optimal policy 
with sticky prices). The findings regarding labor market aggregates are similar; if the 
monetary authority strictly targets a zero inflation rate, the increases in unemployment is 
significantly larger than under the optimal policy. In addition, unemployment displays 
significantly higher volatility and reaches a higher level on average under full price stability, 
while vacancies are lower on average and far more volatile than under optimal policy. 
The current paper can be further extended. One natural extension is to evaluate the 
performance of different Taylor-type rules compared to the optimal policy. Another extension 
is to allow for endogenous participation in the labor force. Finally, future work may consider 
the optimal long-run inflation rate in an economy with labor market frictions, price rigidity, 
DNWR and monetary distortions. It will be interesting to study the optimal inflation rate in 







Sticky Wages, Incomplete Pass-Through and Inflation Targeting: What is the 
Right Index to Target? 
 
3.1     INTRODUCTION 
During the last two decades, Inflation Targeting has emerged as the main monetary policy 
regime of several countries. These countries differ in many aspects, like their development 
levels, sizes, openness degrees, labor markets and foreign exchange markets. These 
differences are perhaps the reason behind the debate on monetary policy in the era of Inflation 
Targeting. They also raise the question, whether countries with different characteristics should 
follow the same monetary policy once they commit to a region-wide policy.  
This paper attempts to characterize monetary policy rules for various structures of 
economies. The main focus of the study is on the flexibility of labor markets, reflected on 
wage rigidity, and on the degrees of sensitivity of consumer prices to movements in exchange 
rates- the degree of pass-through. A country adopting the inflation targeting (IT) regime can 
either target the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which embodies the prices of imported goods, 
or targets a measure of Domestic Price Index (DPI) and allows for exchange rates adjustments. 
Based on the contribution of Gali and Monacelli (2005), hereafter GM, the current study 
revisits this topic by discussing the implications of allowing for both rigid import prices (i.e. 
incomplete pass-through) and rigid nominal wages on monetary policy making.
23
 In particular, 
the study considers three alternative strict monetary policy rules: full stabilization of the CPI, 
full stabilization of the DPI and full stabilization of nominal wages. Stable nominal wages can 
be seen as an intermediate goal for monetary policy. Previous literature had the focus on CPI 
vs. DPI targeting. Study the desirability of nominal wage targeting is one contribution of the 
current study.  
In general, the paper shows that the right index to target depends on the structure of the 
individual economy; some countries may find targeting CPI better than targeting the 
alternative, while other economies may better choose to target their DPIs. Targeting nominal 
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 The rigidities in both nominal wages and imports prices have been reported in several studies of 
recent years. Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) among others show 
evidence for wage rigidity. Campa and Goldberg (2005) among others show evidence for incomplete 
pass-through from exchange rate movements into import prices.  
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wages is favorable for countries with relatively high degrees of nominal wage rigidity and 
wage indexation. These findings may imply that adopting the same regime for countries that 
differ in their structures, as is this case in common-currency areas, may not be desirable for 
some nations.  
The choice of the right index has been discussed in several recent theoretical studies. In a 
relatively similar model to GM, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) found DPI to be better to 
target giving complete pass-through and fully flexible wages. Assuming complete pass-
through, but rigid wages in the GM framework, Campolmi (2006) showed that, given positive 
indexation levels, the best Taylor Rule to follow is the one targeting wage inflation and CPI 
inflation. In a model with fully flexible wages, Devereux, Lane and Xu (2006) also 
recommend targeting DPI in high pass-through environments. They however show that 
targeting the CPI is more desirable when pass-through is low. Based on typical interest rate 
feedback rules, Huang and Liu (2005) suggest that the Monetary Authority (MA) should 
respond to a weighted average of CPI and DPI. Recently, Flamini (2007) suggest that 
targeting DPI is better even when pass-through is low. In general, the rationale behind the 
favorability of DPI targeting is that targeting the CPI requires responding to exchange rates 
movements which makes interest rates, and hence real activity, more volatile.  
The model assumed here is a standard New Keynesian (NK) framework calibrated for a 
prototype small open economy. I assume that domestic prices, import prices and nominal 
wages are rigid. Wages that are not reset during a given period are indexed to past CPI 
inflation. The original work of GM abstracted from rigidity in nominal wages and imports 
prices and it supported targeting the DPI. 
Wage stickiness and wage indexation to the CPI might be crucial for the choice of the 
right index to target. The indexation scheme gives a rise for CPI stabilization, since a variable 
CPI leads to variable aggregate wages and hence to more volatile marginal costs of domestic 
firms. This renders full stabilization of the DPI harder and costly to achieve. Indeed, in a 
closed economy framework, Erceg, Henderson and Levine (2000) show that strict Inflation 
Targeting is suboptimal when both prices and nominal wages are rigid. 
Relaxing the assumption of complete pass-through (CPT) is another empirically-plausible 
modification. One advantage of a floating exchange rate is that it adjusts in response to 
external shocks and thus helps stabilizing the real economy (Devereux, Lane and Xu 2006). 
But, when pass-through is high, this boosts inflation. Therefore, if the Monetary Authority 
targets the CPI, any movement in the exchange rate requires stronger response, which leads to 
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higher variability in both the interest rate and the output gap. This renders CPI targeting less 
desirable. When pass-through is low, however, the cost of the variability of exchange rate is 
relatively low and hence the MA can target CPI inflation and still have the exchange rate 
responding to external shocks. Thus, the desirability of CPI targeting rises in this case. 
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This paper also considers the possibility of targeting nominal wages (i.e. targeting zero 
wage inflation rate). In this sense, nominal wages can be seen as an intermediate goal for 
monetary policy, since the stabilization of nominal wages helps stabilizing the marginal cost 
and hence domestic prices. The degree of indexation to CPI inflation is an important factor in 
determining the desirability of targeting nominal wages.  
The key findings of this paper are as follows. When wages are fully flexible, CPI targeting 
is favorable in low to moderate pass-through degrees (around 0.40 or lower). On the other 
hand, when pass-through is complete, CPI is found to be favorable when both wage rigidity 
and indexation levels are high (around 0.75 or more). When both of the two frictions are 
incorporated, CPI is better to target for relatively high levels of pass-through, wage rigidity 
and indexation. The relevant degrees of pass-through, wage rigidity and indexation are, in 
general, in line with some empirical findings. Also, for high degrees of wage rigidity, 
indexation and pass-through, it might even be better to target nominal wages rather than the 
DPI. Finally, in other cases, the study shows that targeting the DPI is favorable.  
Given these findings, one may wonder whether adopting a similar monetary policy for a 
group of countries that differ in their labor markets, pass through and domestic products 
markets, is desirable. Once committing to a region-wide policy, some countries may indeed be 
conducting monetary policy correctly. Others, however, may not be doing so. Although 
region-wide policy may has its advantages over time, it renders some countries committing to 
a policy rule that would not otherwise been chosen. A research that study differences between 
countries empirically can be helpful to assess these conjectures.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the open economy 
macro model with the proposed modifications. Section 3 describes the calibration 
methodology and the parameterization of the model. Section 4 presents the main results of the 
study. Some sensitivity analyses are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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 Note that I abstract here from imported inputs. Allowing for imported inputs can significantly enrich 
the model since in this case marginal costs of domestic firms will be directly affected by movements in 




3.2     THE MODEL  
This section describes the model economy, a modification of the GM framework. The paper 
relaxes both the assumptions of complete pass-through and fully flexible wage setting. Since 
the model is based on GM and to keep the focus on the main modifications, in what follows I 
only outline the main setup of the model. Therefore, in several occasions the reader may refer 
to their work, as well as Monacelli (2005), for further details.  
 
3.2.1   Households 
The representative household in our Small Open Economy has an access to complete foreign 








 ,                                                                                                        (1) 
where N denotes labor and C stands for composite consumption. The maximization is subject 
to the following sequence of budget constraints 
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with )(, iP tH , )(, iP tF , )(, iC tH and )(, iC tF denoting the price of domestic good i, the price of 
foreign good i and their quantities respectively. tW is the nominal wage, 1, ttQ is a stochastic 
factor in time t+1 of the portfolio hold at the end of time t, 1tD . tT denotes the net lump sum 
transfers.  























  tFtHt CCC  ,                                                                                        (3) 
with tHC , and tFC , denoting aggregate consumption of domestic (home) goods and foreign 
goods, respectively. The parameter represents the degree of openness of the economy while 
  measures the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. Both domestic and 



















































In the above setup, the general price level, i.e. the Consumer Price Index (CPI), is given 
by         
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NV  and 
maximizing preferences subject to the sequence of budget constraints give the following (Log-
Linearized) optimality conditions  





  tttttt ErcEc ,                                                                                          (6) 
where a lower case letter denotes the log of the respective upper case variable, tw is the wage 
rate, t  is the CPI inflation rate,  is the risk aversion parameter,   is the inverse of the 
labor supply elasticity and  represents time preference. Condition (5) states that, in 
equilibrium, households equate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
leisure to the real wage. Condition (6) is the typical Euler Equation in consumption, to which 
we also refer as the New Keynesian IS curve.  
 
3.2.2   Firms 
As is typical in NK models, each firm j is monopolistically competitive and a produces a 
differentiated good with a linear technology in labor of the form 
)()( jNAjY ttt  ,                                                                                                                     (7)   
with A denoting technology. The aggregate production in this economy can be written (in a 
Log-Linearized form) as ttt nay  .  




vapwmc ttHtt  , ,                                                                                                        (8) 
where v is an employment subsidy that offsets the market power of firms. Prices set by 
domestic firms are assumed to be staggering (as in Calvo, 1983), with only a fraction 
H1 allowed to reoptimize each period. Other firms simply keep their prices at time t similar 
to time t-1 prices. The Domestic Price Index (DPI) can thus be written as 
1,,,
~)1(  tHHtHHtH ppp   ,                                                                                            (9) 
where tHp ,
~ stands for the price set by firms who are allowed to change prices. Finally, the last 
result can be combined with the expression for the marginal cost to obtain the following 
forward-looking Phillips Curve (or the AS Curve) for domestic prices: 
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3.2.3   The Real Exchange Rate and Pass-Through 
In this subsection I discuss how does the introduction of incomplete pass-through (IPT) affect 
the setup of GM (2005). Note first that Log-Linearization for CPI inflation is given by 
tHtFt ,, )1(   ,                                                                                                       (11)  
Also, the real exchange rate can be written as  
tttt ppeq 
*
,                                                                                                                   (12)  
with 
*
tp  and te  being foreign prices and the nominal exchange rate, respectively. In terms of 
our model, complete pass-through (or the Law of One Price) implies that 
*
,, tFttF pep  . 
Assuming that the Rest of the World is big and hence the prices of the SOE are negligible in 
determining foreign prices, we have
**
, ttF pp  .  Therefore  
*
, tttF pep  .                                                                                                                       (13)  
To allow for incomplete pass-through, I follow Monacelli (2005) and assume that each 
period only a fraction F1 of the local import retailers are allowed to change their prices. 
Also, retailers import foreign goods at a price (cost) of 
*
,tFt P  and charge a price of tFP , for 
these goods. The above setup leads to an analog expression of (9) given by 
1,,,
~)1(  tFFtFFtF ppp  .                                                                                             (14)  
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Having IPT in place, the deviation from the Law of One Price (LOP) is measured by 
tFtttF ppe ,
*
, )(  .                                                                                                          (15)  
In this setup, we can think about the deviation from the LOP as a marginal cost for the 
importers: they import foreign goods with a price of )( *tt pe  but charge only tFp , .  
Given IPT, the real exchange rate can be written now as (with ts denoting the terms of 
trade) 
tFtt sq ,)1(   .                                                                                                              (16)  
Also, one can obtain an analog for (10) given by  









 . Therefore, import price inflation is higher the higher tF ,  is. 
Also, the parameter F  plays a major role in determining import price inflation. Other things 
equal, a lower F (implying higher degree of pass-through) leads to higher import price 
inflation. As discussed in Monacelli (2005), there are two sources for fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate. The first, due to terms of trade fluctuations, is captured by the first term in (16). 
The second arises because of deviations from the LOP.  
 
3.2.4   Wage Setting 
Motivated by the empirical evidence of wage rigidities reported in several papers in recent 
years (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2005; Smets and Wouters 2003), this paper 
relaxes the assumption of fully flexible wages. In particular, the aggregate labor input of each 

























where w denotes the elasticity of substitution between different labor types. In addition, only 
a fraction ( w1 ) of households can reset their wages (to tw
~ ) each period, while other 
households (partially) index their wages to past CPI inflation.
25
 Such an indexation scheme 
                                                          
25
 Smets and Wouters (2003) reported a degree of indexation of about 0.75 for the EURO area.  
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appears in both Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). 
Under these assumptions, the aggregate wage level each period is given by 
111
~)1(   ttwwtwtwt wwww  ,                                                                            (18)                                                                                                    
with w capturing the degree of indexation (e.g. w =1 corresponds to full indexation). 
Denoting the wage markup by 
w
t and the deviation of the markup from its frictionless level 
by 
w





















t ncpw   )()(ˆ  and 
w being the wage 
markup in a frictionless environment. Note that the first two terms of (19) are typical in wage 
inflation equations with no indexation (e.g. Gali 2002). Current wage inflation is higher the 
higher the expected future wage inflation. If the markup is higher than its frictionless level 
(i.e. 
w
t̂ >0), then wage inflation today tend to decrease in order to prevent a situation of losing 
competitiveness in the labor market. The indexation scheme assumed here introduces two 
more terms that will turn to be significant. Past inflation have a positive effect on wage 
inflation since workers who are not allowed to reset their wages at time t will have higher 
wages the higher past inflation is. On the other hand, because of indexation, households today 
know that even if they cannot reset their wages next period, the higher current inflation 
implies higher wages next period.
26
  
Having sticky wages together with incomplete pass-through, it will prove useful to rewrite 
the above expressions for both DPI and CPI inflation rates in a more explicit way. Note first 













ˆ)1()(ˆ ,  , )1(1   and )1)(2(1  s , (20) 
with x being output gap (the difference between output and its frictionless level). In GM, only 
the first term in the right hand side appears. The two modifications clearly affect the 
determination of the marginal cost of domestic firms: a fluctuating wage markup or LOP gap 
                                                          
26
 In other words, households balance between low wages today in expectation of higher wages in 
future through the indexation channel. The reason is that setting too high wage today will render them 
losing some competitiveness in labor market.  
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leads to a less stable marginal cost. Note also that the expression for tcm ˆ can be substituted 
into (10) to obtain                                                                                             
w












  .     (21) 
The last two terms of (21) introduce more tradeoff for monetary policy makers and they 
endogenously justify the ad-hoc cost-push shock assumed in some NK studies.
27
 In particular, 
the Monetary Authority cannot stabilize DPI inflation, the output gap, the deviation from the 
LOP and the wage markup simultaneously. To see this consider for example a positive 
productivity shock. As a result, the output gap falls but there is a nominal depreciation that 
boosts the LOP gap (assuming  >0). Increasing the interest rate to close the LOP gap will 
result in higher output gap. On the other hand, if the MA attempts to fully stabilize the output 
gap by lowering the interest rate, the LOP will rise thus boosting CPI inflation.  
There is another reason for the inability of the monetary authority to fully stabilize all 
prices and wages when prices and wages are rigid. Since the path of the real wage is tied to the 
path of the marginal product of labor (i.e. technology), the real wage fluctuates with the 
fluctuations in technology. In this case, full stabilization of the wage inflation and price 
inflation is inconsistent with this path. Hence, the monetary authority should choose the best 
choose the best combination of price and wage stabilization that, on one hand allow for real 
wages to adjust, while on the other, leads to lower welfare losses.  
Finally, by using the definition of CPI inflation (equation 11), a similar expression for CPI 
inflation is obtained 
w
tHtFFtxttt xE   ˆ)1())1(()1( ,1    .                              (22)  
As for the case of domestic price inflation, the presence of both rigid wages and import 
prices introduce more tradeoffs for policy making.  Notice also the importance of the openness 
degree in this expression and in particular its role in the tradeoff between inflation 
stabilization and output gap stabilization.
28
 For this reason, the calibration part will devote 
special attention to the openness degree by presenting the effects of varying this parameter on 
the benchmark result.                                                                              
                                                          
27
 The lack of such tradeoff is called the Divine Coincidence in the terminology of Blanchard and Gali 
(2007) and it requires introducing more factors that the policy makers should account for.   
28
 Contrary to the case of DPI inflation, the tradeoff between stabilizing CPI inflation and other 
variables (i.e. output gap) exists also in the case of 0 (because of the term F ). 
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3.2.5   Optimal Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting  
As is typical in the NK literature, the optimal monetary authority is maximize the following 















































  .            (23) 





































 .  (24) 
Here, var(z) denotes the variance of the variable z. In GM (2005), only the first two terms 
of (24) appear (i.e. the variances of both domestic inflation and the output gap). In this paper, 
however, the welfare criterion includes three more terms, namely the variabilities of wage 
inflation, CPI inflation and import price inflation. The Monetary Authority cannot now 
stabilize domestic inflation costlessly.  
 
3.2.6   Policy Target in the Rest of the World    
Following Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Monacelli (2005), I assume that the Monetary 
Authority in the Rest of the World simultaneously stabilizes foreign inflation and output gap 
and hence replicate the flexible price allocation. Note that under the assumption that the Rest 
of the World is too big, foreign CPI coincides with foreign DPI and hence the insignificance 
of the issue of pass-through. Also, for simplicity, I keep to assume no wage rigidity in the 
foreign economy. In short, the ROW is assumed to be as in study of GM (2005).  
 
3.3     CALIBRATION 
To allow for good comparisons to GM, I will use their parameter values in my benchmark 
calibration, although some sensitivity analysis will be presented later. As in their study I 
assume logarithmic utility in consumption (and hence  is set to 1). This assumption makes 
the derivation of the welfare criterion simpler. Next,   is set to be 3 implying a labor supply 
elasticity of 1/3. All gross markups (of domestic firms, importers and workers) will be set to 
1.2 and hence all the elasticities are assumed to be 6 (i.e. 6 wFH  ). Domestic prices 
are assumed to be readjusted every one year, and therefore the parameter H takes the value of 
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0.75. The openness degree is set to 0.4 which implies „home bias‟ in consumption. The 
degrees of wage rigidity, pass-through and indexation will be varied in the analysis below.  
One major change will be in the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign 
goods ( ) assumed to be unity in GM (2005). I follow Monacelli (2005) and set it to 1.5 in 
the baseline calibration although the effects of varying this parameter will be discussed in the 
sensitivity analysis section. The reasons for setting  different from one are twofold. First, 
setting  to 1 is a special and perhaps a restrictive assumption. Second, setting  to unity, 
together with =1, makes both   and s being 1 and hence  is zero. But, this renders the 
third term in the right hand side of (25) insignificant. Hence, in this case the whole idea of 
assuming incomplete pass-through is missed since there is no tradeoff stemming from this 
channel. Setting 5.1 means that  is positive and hence all the discussion becomes more 
relevant.  
Note however that as discussed in GM (2005), when  differs from one, some equations 
hold only up to first order approximation, while they hold exactly when  is one.  Hence, in 
choosing , I trade-off between exact relationships on one hand and gaining some intuition 
from the other (which is more likely when   from one). Given the Linear-Quadratic (LQ) 
approach applied here, this assumption clearly adds to the relevance of the discussion with 
only a mild expense in terms of precision. 
29
 
   
3.4     RESULTS  
This section presents the main results of the study. The first subsection shows the results of 
the paper when only IPT is allowed for (i.e. wages are fully flexible). Subsection 4.2 presents 
my findings in an environment of rigid wages but complete pass-through. By so doing, we are 
able to see the effects of each modification on the choice of the monetary policy rule. Finally, 
subsection 4.3 presents the results of the study when both rigid wages and incomplete pass-
through are allowed. The last step helps to assess monetary policy in a more realistic 
environment in which domestic prices, imported prices and nominal wages are not fully 
flexible.   
                                                          
29
 In this regard, the parameter s in the welfare function differs from one. Assuming 0.1 gives 
1s and hence delivers a loss function similar to that of GM (2005), but of course with more terms.  
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3.4.1   Incomplete Pass-Through and Fully Flexible Nominal Wages   
Figure 3.1 shows the difference in welfare losses, the loss under CPI targeting minus the loss 
under DPI targeting for various degrees of pass-through (all losses are expressed in terms of 
steady state consumption). When PT is complete, targeting the DPI is highly favorable. DPI is 
better to target also in the case of intermediate to high degrees of PT, although the difference 
in losses shrinks. However, when PT is relatively low (around 0.43 or lower), it is better to 
target the CPI. This is the first important finding of the current study, and it suggests the 
significance of relaxing the assumption of complete pass-through.
30
 
To better understand these results, consider the behavior of our main variables under 
different degrees of PT (Figure 3.2). When PT is complete, targeting domestic prices delivers 
zero output gap‟s variability, and hence the zero loss.  On the other hand, when CPI is 
targeted, the variabilities of both DPI and output gap are relatively high. Reducing the degree 
of PT makes things different. As the degree of PT falls, the variabilities of both domestic 
inflation and the output gap under CPI targeting fall, thus implying lower welfare loss. In this 
case however, another factor comes into play- the variability of imported prices. Figure 3.2 
shows that a country targeting its DPI allows for more fluctuations in imported prices. When 
the loss function is expanded to include the variability of these prices, the loss under DPI may 
turn to be higher. Our results above indicate that this is indeed the case.  
Before closing this subsection I present the effects of varying the degree of openness on 
my main results (Table 3.1 and figures 3.3 and 3.4). Since my focus is mainly on the 
desirability of CPI targeting versus DPI targeting, I only show the losses under these two 
regimes. Also, the table presents the results for complete PT and then for PT of 0.35 and 
lower. I choose these values since complete PT is a useful benchmark, and for PT of 0.35 or 
lower, DPI may not be the right index to target. Contrarily, the favorability of DPI targeting 
seems to hold when the pass-through degrees is between 0.35 and 1.0 given that the economy 
is not completely open. Note that for scale reasons, I present the actual losses and the 
differences in losses between CPI targeting and DPI targeting and not the relative losses as I 
will do later.
31
 A positive difference in losses indicates that the DPI is better to target.  
                                                          
30
 Notice also that in the limit (when PT is almost zero), imported prices are fully rigid and hence the 
two regimes coincide. In particular, if imported price are fully rigid, the only variability in CPI comes 
from domestic prices. Hence, setting domestic inflation to zero implies zero CPI inflation and vise 
versa.   
31
 When PT is complete, DPI targeting delivers zero loss while CPI targeting delivers positive losses. 
Therefore, dividing the loss under CPI by the loss under DPI creates scale problems.  
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Few observations are worth-noting. First, targeting CPI leads to lower welfare loss when 
PT is relatively low regardless of the openness degree. This is a significant finding since as 
shown in Campa and Goldberg (2005), few Inflation Targeting countries have degrees of PT 
around 0.40 or lower.  Second, regardless of the openness degree, in the case of complete 
pass-through, targeting CPI cannot be favorable. Third, for a given openness degree, lowering 
the degree of pass-through gives higher loss under DPI targeting (with the exception of course 
of the case of zero PT). Contrarily, for a given openness degree, the loss under CPI targeting 
tends to decrease as PT falls. Finally, When PT is zero, import prices are fully rigid and 
therefore import price inflation is zero. In this case, the only source for fluctuations in the CPI 
is domestic price volatility. Hence, fully stabilizing domestic prices will fully stabilize 
consumer prices and vise versa (i.e. the two regimes coincide). In overall, the results here 
indicate that my earlier finding is robust to varying the degree of openness in the more 
plausible ranges.  
 
3.4.2   Complete Pass-Through and Nominal Wage Rigidity    
This subsection assumes perfect pass-through, but considers the case of rigid nominal wages. 
As discussed above, the degree of indexation ( w ) is another important parameter to account 
for in this case. Hence, in what follows I will outline the results for some levels of wage 
rigidity as well as for specific degrees of indexation.  
Figure 3.5 shows the losses under CPI and WPI targeting relative to the loss under DPI 
targeting. Hence, DPI serves here as a benchmark. I choose to compare the losses under CPI 
and WPI relative to DPI since the later has been typically suggested as the best to target. Also, 
Figure 3.5 assumes an indexation degree of 0.75 in line with empirical findings. It should be 
noted however that all results reported here holds qualitatively also for higher indexation 
degrees and in particular when indexation is full (i.e. )1w .  Depending on the wage 
rigidity degree, some of the results hold also when the indexation degree is relatively low 
(around 0.65).  
The main result is that the relative loss under both CPI targeting and nominal wage 
targeting is lower when the wage rigidity degree is around 0.80 (zero wage inflation is the best 
even for less than 0.80). The main explanation for this finding is as follows. When nominal 
wages are “fundamentally” highly rigid (i.e. w is high), stabilizing nominal wages by policy 
means is relatively less costly than stabilizing the domestic price index. That is, the nature of 
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the labor market makes the costs of full stabilization of wages being relatively low: When 
nominal wages are “fundamentally” rigid, the monetary authority needs less manipulations of 
the interest rate in order to fully stabilize nominal wages. Although, of course, the rigidity in 
nominal wages affects the output gap considerably, it is still less costly than implementing a 
policy that aims at stabilizing domestic prices when nominal wage are highly indexed to CPI 
inflation or when nominal wage are highly flexible. Also, the stabilization of nominal wages 
helps stabilizing domestic prices and this offsets some of its negative effect on welfare 
through the output gap. In other words, targeting nominal wages delivers both zero wage 
inflation and lower variability in domestic inflation, hence lower welfare loss.  
The result that targeting the CPI might be favorable for relatively high degrees of wage 
rigidity and wage indexation confirms our earlier expectations and it is the second important 
finding of the current study. Note that the required levels of wage rigidity and wage indexation 
to prefer WPI or CPI targeting over DPI targeting are in line with some empirical studies (e.g. 




Two more important observations come out from Figure 3.5. First, the relative losses 
under either CPI targeting or WPI targeting are higher for low to moderate degrees of wage 
rigidity and they are actually increasing when w varies between zero and 0.40. The main 
reason is the low loss under DPI targeting for relatively low degrees of wage rigidity. To see 
this, note that the losses under the three type of regimes are increasing in w , indicating higher 
nominal distortions.   However, for w less than 0.40, the loss under DPI increases by less 
compared to the other two regimes. This pattern changes for higher levels of w since at some 
point the effect on the output gap under DPI targeting becomes very high and its targeting 
outweighs the losses under the two other indices. 
Second, since the relative loss under CPI targeting is typically higher than relative loss 
under WPI targeting, we also infer that the loss under CPI targeting tends to be higher than 
under WPI targeting, especially for moderate levels of wage rigidity. It therefore seems that 
stabilizing nominal wages is the best policy to follow when the degrees of wage rigidity and 
indexation are around 75% or higher. Note however that when w approaches 1, the two 
                                                          
32
 Also, Bodart et al. (2006) and Bockerman, Laaksonen and Vainiomaki (2006) report similar 
estimates for wage rigidity in Belgium and Finland, respectivley.  
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regimes deliver the same loss. This is result is as expected: when w is one, the only variation 
in nominal wages comes from indexation to (past) CPI inflation. Hence if the CPI is 
completely stabilized at all dates, nominal wages will be stabilized as well. In fact, fully 
stabilizing nominal wages can occur only if CPI inflation is zero. In short, the two regimes 
coincide in the limit. 
As in the previous case, I examine the effects of different openness degrees on my main 
results (Figure 3.6). The figure shows the loss under CPI relative to the loss under DPI 
targeting where the wage rigidity degree is 0.75 and the indexation rate is 0.50. CPI targeting 
is preferred when the openness degree is around 0.67.  This is an interesting result since recall 
that for these degrees of wage rigidity and wage indexation, the benchmark case (which 
assumes openness degree of 0.40) indicates that DPI is favorable. Also, although not shown 
here, for higher degrees of wage rigidity and wage indexation, CPI becomes the right index to 
target for even lower degrees of openness. Finally, DPI is the is found as the right index to 
target given low levels of openness regardless of the wage indexation and wage rigidity. These 
results only suggest the intuitive idea that more open economies should try to stabilize the 
price index that embed the price of foreign goods since this is simply the more relevant one. 
 
3.4.3   Incomplete Pass-Through and Nominal Wage Rigidity  
I discuss here the ranking of the three indices when the two frictions are both introduced.
33
 In 
this case we look at three important parameters simultaneously: the degrees of PT, wage 
rigidity and wage indexation. To do so, I first choose some indexation level. Next I choose 
some PT degrees and finally the degrees of wage rigidity.  
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 show the results for w is 0.75 and 0.90, respectively. I choose 
these degrees of indexation both because they are in line with empirical evidence and since the 
results for lower indexation degrees generally indicate DPI as a better index to target, 
especially compared to CPI targeting. To focus on the main findings of the paper, on one 
hand, and in order to economize in presentation, on the other, I present only the results for 
these levels of indexations. Also, since I need to account for the degrees of pass-through, I 
show the results for two levels of pass-through (0.80 and 0.90 respectively).  
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As before, each figure presents the losses under CPI targeting and WPI targeting relative 
to DPI targeting. Figure 3.7 reveals that when nominal wage rigidity is relatively high 
( w =0.90 or more) and the indexation degree is 0.75, targeting wage inflation is better than 
targeting the DPI. This result is particularly true when pass-through is 0.90. Also, targeting the 
wage inflation seems to be better than targeting the CPI inflation for almost all levels of wage 
rigidity (but note again that the two regimes coincide in the limit). Figure 3.8 supports these 
conclusions. In this case, targeting both the CPI and the WPI become favorable if wages are 
highly rigid (around 0.85 or more), although the degree of wage rigidity needed is a bit lower. 
This result holds for similar reasons as discussed in the last subsection.  
Few more observations can be inferred from figures 3.3 and 3.4. The higher the degree of 
indexation is, the lower the relative losses under both CPI and WPI. It should be noted 
however that the loss under WPI increases with the degree of indexation since the higher the 
indexation rate, the more costly full stabilization of the wage inflation is. The loss under CPI 
targeting does not vary with the indexation degree since when CPI inflation is zero, the wage 
indexation degree is irrelevant. Hence, as the relative loss under CPI is considered, the 
difference between Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 comes from the fact that the losses under DPI 
targeting are higher for higher degrees of indexation.    
I close this subsection by considering the effect of varying the openness degree on my 
main results. Since I need to control for few parameters, I choose here to show the results only 
when the degree of openness is 0.60, but with noting that some of the results hold qualitatively 
for other degrees of openness (e.g. 0.50). Moreover, I assume a relatively moderate degree of 
indexation (of 0.75) both because of its empirical plausibility and since around which the 
favorability of DPI targeting may cease to hold.  As for PT, I assume two different levels, 0.50 
and 0.80. I choose these levels of PT for two reasons. First, they are empirically plausible; the 
study of Campa and Goldberg (2005) indicates that the average PT is around 0.46 in the short 
run and 0.64 in the long run. The study of Campa, Goldberg and Gonzales-Minguez (2005), 
shows relatively higher averages of PT (0.66 and 0.80) in the Euro area. Second, the results 
above show that in the presence of wage rigidity, CPI is better to target only if PT is relatively 
high. Hence, it will be interesting to check whether the CPI is the right index to target for 
moderate levels of PT given higher openness degree. Needless to say, the main results 
reported below hold also in the case of higher PT and indexation degrees.  
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Figure 3.9 shows that, given an indexation degree of 0.75, targeting CPI is better if wage 
rigidity is high and PT is moderate to high. Notice that this result differs from the result above 
where, for the same indexation degree, DPI is always favorable. Although not shown here, 
CPI may be the best to target in the case of indexation degree of 0.65 given high degrees of 
wage rigidity. In short, the results found in my calibration regarding the desirability of CPI 
targeting are only supported and even strengthened for more open economies.  
 
3.5     SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
This section presents some sensitivity analysis by changing some of the benchmark 
parameters. Note that I do not show the effects of different parameterization on the 
performance of wage inflation targeting relative to other rules, and hence keep the focus on 
the comparison between CPI and DPI targeting. The first parameter to change is the elasticity 
of substitution between home and foreign goods ( ) assumed to be 1.5 in my benchmark 
calibration (and 1.0 in GM). Next, I will change the degree of domestic price rigidity 
(assumed above to be 0.75). Finally, the elasticities of substitution between domestic goods 
( H ), foreign goods ( F ) as well as between labor inputs ( W ) will be varied. This basically 
allows for different levels of markup in each of these markets.  
 
3.5.1   Changing the Elasticity of Substitution between Home and Foreign Goods ( ):  
I assume that can take any level between 0.3 and 2.25. In addition, I assume the more 
relevant levels of indexation (set to be 0.75), wage rigidity (0.75 and 0.80) as well relatively 
high degree of PT (0.80).  The results are presented in Figure 3.10.  
When wage rigidity is 0.75, CPI targeting leads to lower loss given that   falls below 
0.70. for higher levels of  , DPI seems to be better to target. Increasing the wage rigidity 
degree only slightly (to 0.80) shows that CPI is favorable when  is less than 1.0. Hence, as 
the degree of wage rigidity increases, CPI yields lower losses for a wider range of  . Also, 
given some wage rigidity degrees, he higher the indexation rate, the wider the range under 
which CPI targeting is favorable. Increasing the degree of PT in this case will also support CPI 





3.5.2   Changing the Degree of Domestic Price Rigidity ( H ): 
So far, the study assumed a degree of domestic price rigidity of 0.75 for the case of CPI 
targeting. In this subsection I check whether the results can be altered once different levels of 
domestic price rigidities are assumed. Notice that since, by definition, DPI targeting 
corresponds to H being 1, the only effects to consider are on the loss under CPI targeting. 
Moreover, I have chosen the more relevant degrees of wage indexation and pass-through (both 
set to 0.75).  
I first change H to 0.50. The results (not reported here) show that in this case the loss 
under CPI is even larger than under H of 0.75, reflecting highly variable domestic prices. 
Next, I increase H to 0.90 and found lower loss under CPI compared to the benchmark case. 
In all of these occasions however, the loss under CPI is higher than the loss under DPI. Hence, 
the benchmark calibration level of H has no effect on the qualitative results.  
 
3.5.3   Changing the Elasticities of Substitution between Domestic Goods ( H ), Foreign 
Goods ( F ) and Between Workers ( W ): 
This subsection conducts the last sensitivity analysis of the study. Since there are 3 different 
parameters to vary, I do not go into details here and only report the basic results qualitatively. 
The whole analysis is done assuming pass-through, wage rigidity and indexation degrees of 
0.75. The main outcome of this exercise is that changing the three parameters in the more 
relevant range (between 4 and 11) do not change the basic results of the paper. 
 
3.6     CONCLUSIONS 
This paper studies monetary policy rules in the era of Inflation Targeting in an economy with 
multiple nominal rigidities. Particularly, the paper assumes domestic price rigidity, import 
price rigidity (incomplete pass-through) and nominal wage rigidity. The study then contrasts 
welfare losses under two different inflation targeting regimes (of the domestic price index and 
the consumer price index) as well as the losses under fully stable nominal wages (to which we 
refer as wage inflation targeting). Wage inflation targeting basically examines the desirability 
of targeting an intermediate goal for monetary policy. The main focus however remains on 
comparing CPI targeting and DPI targeting.     
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Allowing for rigid import prices, but fully flexible wages, the study shows that targeting 
CPI is better when pass-through is relatively low to moderate (around 0.40 or lower). This 
degree of PT has been reported to be the case of few Inflation Targeting economies and hence 
the significance of the result. This finding is robust to changing the degree of openness.  
When complete pass-through is restored and wage rigidity is assumed instead, CPI 
targeting turns to be better than DPI targeting for relatively high degrees of both wage rigidity 
and wage indexation to CPI inflation. Particularly, when the indexation degree and the wage 
rigidity degree are both around 0.75, the economy better target its CPI in order to avoid large 
fluctuations in marginal costs (through fluctuating nominal wages) and hence in both domestic 
prices and the output gap. Also, fully stabilizing nominal wages in such an environment (in 
which nominal wages are very rigid by nature) may even be the superior choice.   
The key results for the case of both rigid wages and import prices are similar to the case of 
only rigid wages. Having high degrees of both wage rigidity and indexation, CPI tends to be a 
better index to target given high degrees of PT. This result is undoubtedly important since it 
suggests a different conclusion from GM‟s even for high pass-through. When PT is low 
however, CPI ceases to be favorable even if wages are relatively rigid and highly indexed to 
CPI inflation. However, increasing the degree of openness reveals that CPI is better to target 
also in moderate PT environments (around 0.50). Moreover, the study points to the 
favorability of targeting nominal wages in this economic environment. 
In overall, the paper suggests that the right index to target depends on the specific 
structure of the individual economy. Countries with low flexible nominal wages, high degrees 
of wage indexation and high pass-through should target their CPI. The same conclusion holds 
for countries with low degrees of pass-through and highly flexible wages. Relatively open 
countries with moderate to high indexation degrees and rigid wages should also target their 
CPIs. Economies with high degrees of wage rigidity may also consider the possibility of full 
stabilization of nominal wages. Other countries better target their Domestic Price Index. In 
this regard, some countries may not be following the best monetary policy rule once 
committing to a common policy.  
This study can also be further extended. One possible extension is adding imported inputs 
and then considering the ranking of the different indices. Allowing for rigid export prices or 
incomplete pass-through in the foreign economy is another modification to consider. Finally, 
it would also be interesting to rank the indices according to some Taylor-Type Rules, which 
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PT=1.00 PT=0.35 PT=0.25 PT=0.00 
Openness DPI CPI DPI CPI DPI CPI   DPI           CPI 
0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.2589 0.2037 0.3998 0.2579 0.0000 0.0000 
0.25 0.0000 0.0415 0.1204 0.0735 0.1878 0.0904 0.0000 0.0000 
0.50 0.0000 0.0622 0.0591 0.0491 0.0923 0.0456 0.0000 0.0000 
0.75 0.0000 0.0497 0.0246 0.0391 0.0383 0.0322 0.0000 0.0000 
1.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 3.1: Welfare losses under CPI and DPI targeting for various values of openness and PT degrees 
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Figure 1.1: The Penalty Function ( =889.11). 
 










Figure 1.2: The standard deviation of the static wedge for various optimal annual  
inflation rate (in percents). The driving processes: Markup and TFP Shocks. 
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Figure 1.3: Response to negative and positive markup shocks with financial frictions 
 (percentage deviations from SS levels). Inflation is shown in annualized terms. 
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Figure 1.4: Response to negative and positive TFP shocks with financial frictions 
 (percentage deviations from SS levels). Inflation is shown in annualized te 
74 
 































Figure 2.1: The standard deviation of the intertemporal wedge and the 
optimal annual inflation rate with varying the degree of price rigidity. 
































Figure 2.2: The size of the intertemporal wedge and the 
optimal annual inflation rate with varying the degree of price rigidity. 
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Figure 2.3: The standard deviation of the intertemporal wedge as a function of 
the degree of DNWR with sticky prices under optimal policy and zero-inflation policy. 









































Figure 2.4: The standard deviation of the intertemporal wedge as a function of 










Mean of Unemployment Rate
 
 














SD of Unemployment Rate
 
 










               Figure 2.5: The mean value the unemployment rate (in percents),  
               the mean of vacancies,the standard deviations of the unemployment rate  
               and vacancies for various levels of annual inflation rates (in percents).  
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Figure 2.6: Response to a negative productivity shock with asymmetric wage adjustment cost 
function (percentage deviations from SS levels).   1 : a positive 1 standard deviation shock.  1 : a 
negative 1 standard deviation shock. 2 : a positive 1 standard deviation shock.  2 : a negative 1 
standard deviation shock. 
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     Figure 2.7: Responses to productivity shocks with symmetric wage adjustment cost function 
(percentage deviations from SS levels).   1 : a positive 1 standard deviation shock.  1 : a negative 






























































Figure 2.8: Responses to negative productivity shocks- Flexible nominal wages, symmetric wage 


























































Figure 2.9: Responses to a 1 standard deviation negative productivity shocks with asymmetric wage 














Figure 3.1: Difference in welfare losses under CPI and DPI targeting for various values of PT. 
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Domestic price inflation 











Deviation from Law of One Price 








































                   Figure 3.3: Welfare Losses under CPI and DPI targeting (as a percentage of SS  
consumption) and for various openness values and for given degrees of PT. 
 















                    Figure 3.4: Differences in welfare Losses under CPI and DPI targeting (as a percentage of 





















                    Figure 3.5: The losses under CPI targeting and wage inflation targeting relative to the loss      






















                 Figure  3.6: The loss under CPI targeting relative the loss under DPI targeting for various 


















WPIT vs. DPIT, PT=0.90
WPIT vs. DPIT, PT=0.80
 CPIT vs. DPIT, PT=0.90
 CPIT vs. DPIT, PT=0.80
 
                    Figure 3.7: The losses under CPI targeting and wage inflation targeting relative to the loss   
under DPI targeting with incomplete pass-through and rigid wages under different degrees 
of wage rigidity. Indexation degree=0.75. 
  













WPIT vs. DPIT, PT=0.90
WPIT vs. DPIT, PT=0.80
 CPIT vs. DPIT, PT=0.90
 CPIT vs. DPIT, PT=0.80
 
                    Figure 3.8: The losses under CPI targeting and wage inflation targeting relative to the loss              
under DPI targeting with incomplete pass-through and rigid wages under different degrees 



















                        Figure 3.9: The losses under CPI targeting relative to the loss under DPI targeting with     





















                          Figure 3.10: The loss under CPI Targeting relative to the loss under DPI Targeting for  




PROOFS AND DERIVATIONS 
1A    The Households’ Problem 









t lvcuE  ,                                                                                                         (A1) 










                                            (A2) 
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint by t , the first order conditions 
with respect to tc , tb , ts and tl  are, respectively: 

















  ,                                                                                                              (A4)                                                                                                      
   0111   tttttt dqEq  ,                                                                                      (A5)   
and,   
0)1(,  tttl wv  .                                                                                                        (A6) 
Combining (A3) and (A6) gives equation (6) in the text. Combining (A3) and (A4) gives 
equation (7), and the combination of equations (A3) and (A5) yields equation (8) in the text. 
 
1B    The Entrepreneurs’ Problem 









t qedqelwlApE  ,                                                                (B1) 
subject to 0)(1  ttttt lwdqe  .                                                                                   (B2) 
Denoting the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (B2) by t , the choice of labor yields: 
0 ttttt wwpA  ,                                                                                                        (B3) 
or, after collecting terms, 
)1( tttt wpA  ,                                                                                                              (B4) 
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which is equation (12) in the text.  
Similarly, the first-order condition with respect to te gives:  
    0))(()()( 1111,01111,01,0   tttttttttttttt dqEdqEq  ,             (B5)  























E  .                                                                               (B6)               
This is condition (13) in the text.         
 
1C    The Approximated Entrepreneurs’ Problem 





















 ,  (C1) 
The first order condition with respect to tl yields: 







.                                                       (C2) 
Letting t =  ))((exp
1
1 ttttt dqelw  

, condition (C2) can now be written as 
0)1(  tttt wAp  ,                                                                                                       (C3) 
which is equation (21) in the text.  








































      ,                (C4) 
or, by using the definition of t , 
   ))()(()()( 1111,0111,0,0   ttttttttttt dqEdqEq  =0.                      (C5) 
Rearranging equation (C5) gives equation (22) in the text.   
 
1D    Operating Profits of Entrepreneurs in the Approximated Model 





t lwlAp                                                                                                                 (D1) 
Recall, from equation (B4) above, that )1( tttt wAp  . Hence: 
)1( tttttt lwlAp  ,                                                                                                         (D2) 
Using the production function of entrepreneurs ( )ttt lAx  , condition (D2) can be written 
as: 










.                                                                                                                      (D4)  











,                                                                                                          (D5) 










.                                                                                                              (D6) 
Condition (D6) states that operating profits are positive in an equilibrium with a binding 
collateral constraint. Clearly, if  is zero (i.e. no part of wages is secured by net worth), then 
operating profits are zero in equilibrium (as one would expect in a perfectly competitive 
sector). Similarly, if the collateral constraint does not bind, then these profits will be zero as 
well, since in this case the economy is behaving as if there is no collateral constraint to begin 











, with t as defined in the text. The derivations are similar to the 
ones just shown, and therefore they are not presented here.  
 
1E    Efficient Allocations and the Labor Wedge 









t lvcuE  ,                                                                                                         (E1) 
subject to the sequence of resource constraints 
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0 ttt clA .                                                                                                                         (E2) 
Let t be the Lagrange multiplier associated with (E2), then, the first-order conditions with 
respect to tc and tl , respectively, read   
ttcu , ,                                                                                                                                 (E3) 
and 
tttl Av , .                                                                                                                             (E4) 










,                                                                                                                               (E5) 
and hence efficiency requires the marginal rate of substitution (the left hand side of condition 
E5) to be equal to the marginal product of labor (given by the right-hand side of condition E5). 
Given this result, one can derive the expression for the intratemporal (static) wedge. To do 
























.                                                                                                           (E6) 
Comparison of (E5) and (E6) reveals that the wedge is defined by the term in the 
parentheses. Clearly, this wedge is directly affected by the existence of the collateral 
constraint.  
 
1F    The Labor Market Subsidy 
The labor marker subsidy is introduced to render the deterministic steady state of the model 
efficient. In particular, this subsidy is chosen so that, in the deterministic steady sate, the 
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and labor is equal to marginal 
product of labor (MPL). The derivations for labor market subsidy in the approximated model 
are similar to what follows, but with  replacing wherever it appears.  
In what follows, undated variables denoted the deterministic steady state level of the 





l )1(  ,                                                                                                                        (F1) 
The left-hand side of (F1) is the MRS between consumption and labor, hence: 
91 
 
wMRS )1(                                                                                                                      (F2) 





 .                                                                                                                (F3) 







 ,                                                                                                                 (F4) 





 .                                                                                                                   (F5) 
Finally, recall that p equals the marginal cost of final-good firms (mc), which, in the 












 .                                                                                                                          (F6) 
Therefore, the labor market subsidy depends both on the level of the “real interest rate” and 
the degree of the monopolistic distortion (represented by ). If no wage is required to be 
secured (i.e.  =0), or if the collateral constraint does not bind (i.e.  =0), then the labor 
market subsidy should correct only the monopolistic distortion. On the other hand, when 
 approaches infinity (which corresponds to perfect competition in the final-good 
sector), approaches . This result is as expected since, with perfect competition, the only 
inefficiency in the allocation of l comes from existence of the financial friction. Clearly, if the 
choice of labor is unconstrained and the final-good sector is perfectly competitive, there is no 
distortion to correct for, and hence the labor market subsidy is zero.  
 
1G   Deriving the Philips Curve 
















































 ,                                                      (G1) 

















 .                                                                                                                   (G2) 








































































.                                 (G3) 










































































































































  .                    (G4) 
In equilibrium, all firms set the same price (i.e. jtP = tP  for all j). Imposing symmetry on 



















































































































































































 , we get 



















Emc  ,                                       (G7) 






































  ,                                       (G8) 




1H   Mapping Between the Price Duration and the Price Rigidity Parameter 
I show here the way to map between the price duration and the price rigidity parameter. To do 
so, let us define the price duration by and probability of not resetting the price during a given 






 .                                                                                                                          (H1) 




.                                                                                                                                  (H2) 




. Substituting (H1) shows that the slope with the Calvo‟s approach 







.                                                                                                                        (H3) 









which is the equation reported in the text.  
 
1I    The link between Inflation and the Lagrange Multiplier on the Collateral constraint 
Recall that the labor‟s demand function is given by )1( tttt wpA  and the real price of an 








 .                                                                                                                (I1)                                                                                                            
































 ,                                                                               (I2) 
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 and so, the real marginal cost is positively related to t . This condition suggests the collateral 
constraint (represented by t in condition I2) affects inflation through the marginal cost. To 










































)1( ,                                             (I3)          
which shows inflation as an implicit function of the expected future inflation and the current 














































































1 .   (I4) 
Basically, t acts as cost-push shock (even when  is constant), so that a rise in t is 
associated with an increase in inflation at time t. This is similar to the idea in the log-
linearized version of CFP, where t  manifests itself as an endogenous mark-up shocks.  
In the approximated model t replaces t wherever it appears.  
 
1J   The Equivalence to a Model with Intra-Period Loans  
I show here that there is equivalence between the main setup of the paper and a model where 
part of the wage bill needs to be paid ahead of production (the standard “working capital” 
requirement),  entrepreneurs need to borrow in order pay this part of wages, and the borrowing 
is constrained by their net worth.  
The model is modified in the following way. Households are assumed to lend to 
entrepreneurs (say through a perfectly-competitive intermediation sector). They deposit
h
tB  in 
the beginning of period t and earn an interest rate of
h
tR in the end of the same period. Their 









t lvcumaxE  ,                                                                                                   (J1) 







tttttt TPPDQslwPBRBRBBsQcP   )()1( 111  ,  (J2) 

















                        (J3) 
The choices of consumption, bonds, labor supply and shares of final-good firms yield the 


















































uEu 111,,   ,                                                                                            (J6) 
and, 
1htR .                                                                                                                                    (J7) 
As for entrepreneurs, at the beginning of the period each entrepreneur obtains a 
loan
e
tB from households, which is to be paid in the end of the period at a nominal gross 
interest rate of
e
tR . His borrowing, however, is constrained by the beginning-of-the-period net 















t qedqelwbRblApE  ,                                            (J8) 
subject to  
0)(1 
e




t lwb  .                                                                                                                     (J10) 
Letting t and t denote the Lagrange multiplier on the constraints (J9) and (J10), 





tt R  .                                                                                                                  (J11) 
Similarly, the first order condition with respect to tl yields: 
0)1(  tttt wpA  .                                                                                                       (J12) 
Finally, the first order condition with respect to te yields 
   ))()(()()( 1111,0111,0,0   ttttttttttt dqEdqEq  =0.                     (J13) 
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In equilibrium, the interest rate that households earn on their deposits will be equal to the 
interest rate that entrepreneurs pay, and hence 1etR . Using this fact, equation (J11) becomes: 
tt   ,                                                                                                                                 (J14) 
which, by substituting in (J12) gives  
0)1(  tttt wpA  .                                                                                                      (J15) 
which is exactly as equation (12) in the text. Rearranging condition (J13) gives condition (13) 
in the text. 
 
1K   The Deterministic Steady State 
In this appendix, I present some analytical solutions for the deterministic steady state. The 
starting point is the assumption that households devote 30 percent of their time for work, and 
hence l is set to 0.3 in the SS. In addition, in the absence of shocks, the optimal inflation rate is 
zero, and hence  =1. This result can be shown by considering the first-order condition of the 
optimal Ramsey planner with respect to inflation ( t ) in the deterministic steady state. In this 
case, this condition reads 
 0)1)(( 87  y .                                                                                                       (K1) 
7 and 8 are the Lagrange multipliers on the resource constraint (condition 18) and 
dividends (equation 19), respectively. Both of these condition holds with equality in the 
deterministic steady state and hence 7  and 8 are both positive. Hence, the solution is  =1.  
Imposing deterministic steady state on equation (15) in the text, the deterministic steady 
state value of mc equals the inverse of the gross markup (i.e.

 1
mc ). The deterministic 
steady state value of technology (A) is set to 1. 
Under the assumption that the collateral constraint holds with equality in the deterministic 
steady state, we have

1













w .                                                                                                                      (K2) 
Imposing SS on equation (17) gives the SS value of dividends )1( mcAld  , which, 
after substituting for A and mc, can be written as 

l
d  .                                                     (K3)                                                                                                                            
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 .                                                                                                                        (K4) 
Since the collateral constraint holds with equality in the SS, shares of entrepreneurs can 
















e ,                                                                                                         (K5) 
which is zero when 0 . Intuitively, if no wage is required to be backed by collateral, then 
the entrepreneur has no reason to accumulate assets. Also, the SS value of e is increasing in , 
as expected. The higher the curvature parameter in the penalty function the higher the penalty 
for any violation of the collateral constraint. Hence, in order to avoid occasions where the 












e ,                                                                                                              (K6) 
which implies a negative relationship between e and  . Intuitively, the more shares 
entrepreneurs have the more collateral they will have which reduces the value of the , the 
equivalent of the Lagrange multiplier. 
 
1L    The Households’ Problem with Money in the Utility 





























,                                                                           (L1) 
subject to the sequence of budget constraints of the form: 
ttttttttttttttttttt TPPDQslwPMBRMBsQcP   )()1( 1111  ,  (L2) 
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with 1tM denoting nominal money holdings at the beginning of period t. Real money 


































































cm                                                                                                                 (L6) 
The households‟ equilibrium conditions include now the money demand function 




















2A   Deriving the Philips Curve: 
I show here the derivation of the Phillips curve which is the outcome of the first-order 




































































 ,   (A1) 
subject to the sequence of laws of motion of employment, and the : 
))()(1(1 tjtjtjt qvnn   ,                                                                                              (A2) 















)(  .                                                                                                     (A3) 
Associating a Lagrange multiplier jt with (A3), the first-order condition with respect to 








































































































































  .                           (A4) 
In equilibrium, all firms set the same price (i.e. jtP = tP  for all j). Imposing symmetry on 
























































































































































































u 11  


































 ,                                       (A7) 
which is equation (20) in the text.  
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2B   Optimal Monetary Policy Problem:  
The optimal monetary policy problem is to choose },,,,,,,,{ wttttttttt wunhc  to 
maximize household‟s expected discounted lifetime utility subject to the resource constraint of 











































































































































































































































































,                                                                                                                                   (B6) 







 ttmtt unn ,                                                                                                    (B8) 
and, 


























2C   Efficient Allocations: 









t hvncuE  ,                                                                                                    (C1) 
subject to the sequence of the economy-wide resource constraints 
 0)(  ttttt vchfzn  ,                                                                                                      (C2) 
and the sequence laws of motion of employment 
  0),1()1( 1  tttt nvnmn                                                                                       (C3) 
Let, t1 and t1 denote the Lagrange multipliers on constraints (C2) and (C3), respectively. 
Then, the first-order condition with respect to tc , tv and 1tn , respectively, are 
tctu 1 ,                                                                                                                                (C4) 
  0),1()1(21  ttvtt vnm ,                                                                               (C5) 
and, 
    0),1(1)1()()( 12111112   ttutttttttt vnmEhfzEhv  .             (C6) 












 ,                                                                                              (C7) 










 .                                                                                              (C8) 






























































,   (C9) 



















































.                                   (C10)  
The left hand side is the Intertemporal Marginal Rate of Substitution (IMRS), while the 
right hand side is Intertemporal Marginal Rate of Transformation (IMRT). Efficiency, thus, 
requires the IMRT being equal to the IMRS for all t.  











































































 .                   (C11) 
 
2D   The Intertemporal Wedge 














































,                                (D1) 



















































































































































































































hwhfz . (D4) 























































































hfzhw . (D5) 
After iterating one period ahead and collecting terms, equation (D5) can now be substituted 



















































































































.  (D6) 






























































































































By comparing (D7) with (C9), efficiency is restored if nominal wages are fully flexible or 
fully stabilized (i.e. 
W
t 1 =0, and hence  1t ), the Hosios condition holds (   ), the 
unemployment benefits are zero (b=0), and no monopolistic power in the final-good sector 
(which implies 1t =1). Finally, the wedge is implicitly defined by the comparing equation 
(D7) and (C9).  
























































































































,  (D8)   
where the left-hand side is the intertemporal rate of substitution (IMRS) and the right-hand side is the intertemporal rate 





















































































































































.    (D9) 
Comparison of the square brackets in (D9) with the square brackets of (C11) implicitly 























3A   The Optimal Monetary Policy Problem  
In the general case where the economy features rigidities in domestic prices, import prices and 
nominal wages, the problem of the Monetary Authority is to choose allocations 





































































































  , (A1) 





,1,   tFttttFtF rr  ,                                                                                    (A3) 
tHtFt ,, )1(   ,                                                                                                      (A4) 
1 tt
w















































 ,  (A6) 
  )( ,1,1,1 tFtFtxttHtsttt ErrrxEx 


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